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The advent of virtual schools has created uncertainty for
school officials seeking to discipline students for speech. This
uncertainty is fueled partly by the ostensibly omnipresent nature of
virtual speech and partly by the fact that the United States
Supreme Court has never ruled on the free speech rights of
students in virtual schools. This Article analyzes the current First
Amendment student speech jurisprudence in order to determine
whether school officials have censorship authority over students’
virtual on-campus speech as well as students’ virtual off-campus
speech. To further this analysis, it is important to understand the
nature of virtual schools. Therefore, the Article presents an
overview of virtual schools, the instructional methods used in
virtual schools as well as virtual schools’ regulation of student
behavior through acceptable use policies (“AUPs”) and student
codes of conduct. In addition to analyzing the quartet of United
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States Supreme Court student-speech cases, decided in the context
of on-campus speech, for language that could provide censorship
authority over virtual speech, the Article examines how lower
courts address virtual students’ speech rights. It also discusses
how courts distinguish on-campus virtual speech from off-campus
virtual speech. Additionally, the Article presents guidelines for
virtual schools to avoid unconstitutional exercise of censorship
authority over student speech. Pursuant to this, the Article
examines virtual schools under the public forum doctrine as well
as the government speech doctrine. Finally, the Article discusses
the First Amendment status of virtual school AUPs that censor
offensive student speech on the basis of race, gender, or sexual
orientation.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
The ubiquity of the Internet in the current digital age as well as
the prevalence of technology as a staple in student culture has
fueled the quest for innovative ways to harness technology in
education.1 Virtual schools constitute one such innovation designed
to change the way schooling is delivered. 2 Virtual schools are
schools in which “learning is not bound by time, space and pace,
liberating education systems from the confines of rigid blocks of
time and uninspired configurations of space to better meet the
needs of students.”3 They constitute a paradigm shift from long1

Justice Oliver Holmes encouraged the competition of ideas as a means of
encouraging free speech, rather than censorship, when he noted that “the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). In other words, information sharing and more speech is better than
censorship. The Internet makes the sharing of information and speech more
pragmatic and accessible. Indeed, “today, the Internet has become the latest
realization of the ‘marketplace of ideas’ so critical to the democracy envisioned
by the Founding Fathers.” Julie J. Geng, When Forums Collide: The San
Francisco Bart As A Battleground For The First Amendment In The Internet
Era, 10 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y for INFO. SOC’Y 127, 176 (2014).
2
See, e.g., Jan Hawkins, Technology-Mediated Communities for Learning:
Designs and Consequences, 514 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 159, 160
(1991).
3
Gregg Vanourek & Evergreen Education Group, An (Updated) Primer on
Virtual Charter Schools: Mapping the Electronic Frontier, NACSA CYBER
SERIES ISSUE BRIEF 3 (Sept. 2011), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED544289.pdf
(last visited June 16, 2015). Internationally, the term “ICT”, which stands for
Information and Communication Technologies, is also sometimes used to refer
to virtual schools. Id. These schools are sometimes referred to as online schools,
cyber schools, internet-based learning, distance learning schools or Web-based
distance learning schools, eCommunity schools, networked classrooms, or
electronic or e-schools. See Matthew D. Bernstein, Whose Choice Are We
Talking About? The Exclusion of Students With Disabilities From For-Profit
Online Charter Schools, 16 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 487, 489 (2013); Gillian
Locke et al., Virtual Schools: Assessing Progress and Accountability Final
Report
of
Study
Findings,
PUB.
IMPACT
7
(2014),
http://www.charterschoolcenter.org/sites/default/files/files/field_publication_atta
chment/Virtual%20Schools%20Accountability%20Report_0.pdf (last visited
June 16, 2015); Paul Kim et al., Public Online Charter School Students:
Choices, Perceptions, and Traits, 49 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 521, 522 (2012);
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standing tradition which dictates that instruction will be delivered
in a physical space consisting of desks or tables directed toward a
podium, chalkboard or lecturer.4
Public virtual schools must comply with the dictates of the
United States Constitution with respect to students.5 Accordingly,
the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause applies to student
speech that occurs in virtual schools. However, school
administrators might be confused about how to appropriately
address First Amendment concerns in a virtual school setting. As
the Ninth Circuit noted:
[T]he challenge for administrators is made all the more difficult
because, outside of the official school environment, students are instant
messaging, texting, emailing, Twittering, Tumblring, and otherwise
communicating electronically, sometimes about subjects that threaten
the safety of the school environment. At the same time, school officials
must take care not to overreact and to take into account the creative
juices and often startling writings of the students.6

This Article addresses the intersection of virtual schools and
the First Amendment rights of students. Part II of the Article
provides background information on virtual schools to foster an
understanding of these schools. Part III provides an overview of
the instructional methods used by virtual schools. Part IV discusses
how virtual schools try to control behavior through acceptable use
policies (“AUPs”) and student codes of conduct. Part V examines
whether the quartet of United States Supreme Court cases decided
in the context of on-campus speech apply to virtual speech and offcampus speech.
Margaret Lin, School Quality in the Cloud: Guidelines for Authorizing Virtual
Charter Schools, NACSA CYBER SERIES ISSUE BRIEF 1 (2011),
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED544280.pdf (last visited June 16, 2015); Joe
Ableidinger et al., Policy Guide: Online and Blended Charter Schools, NACSA
CYBER SERIES 1 (2012); Hawkins, supra note 2, at 160.
4
David Jaffee, Virtual Transformation: Web-Based Technology and
Pedagogical Change, 31 TEACHING SOC. 227, 228 (2003).
5
Public schools are subdivisions and instrumentalities of the state and are
bound by the United States Constitution, as are all subdivisions and
instrumentalities of the state. See Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 106
(1967); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964).
6
Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013).
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Part VI examines how lower courts address the First
Amendment free speech rights of virtual students in light of the
Supreme Court’s absence on the issue. This discussion includes
how lower courts distinguish on-campus speech from off-campus
virtual speech. It also examines the status of off-campus virtual
speech brought onto a school’s campus.
Part VII discusses how virtual schools can ensure that their
campuses are recognized by the judiciary as an expansive campus,
increasing their authority to censor student speech. Part VIII is an
analysis of virtual schools under the public forum doctrine while
Part IX presents a government speech analysis of virtual student
speech. Part X analyzes whether AUPs that restrict offensive
speech on the basis of race, gender, or sexual orientation violate
the First Amendment prohibition against content-based
discrimination.
II.
OVERVIEW OF VIRTUAL SCHOOLS
The first references to virtual schools in the educational
literature were to two initiatives in Canada in the mid-1990s.7 The
first two virtual schools appeared in the United States in 1997.8
Since that time, virtual schools have experienced rapid growth.9 At
the present time, almost 250,000 students are enrolled in these
schools.10 At least 200,000 students attend full-time virtual schools,
and enrollment at such schools is increasing annually at a rate of
fifteen to twenty percent.11 Virtual schools have spread so quickly
that twenty-seven states as well as the District of Columbia have at
least a full-time virtual school, covering several districts or the

7

Vanourek & Evergreen Education Group, supra note 3.
Id.
9
Id. at 7.
10
Gary Miron & Jessica Urschel, Understanding and Improving Full-Time
Virtual Charter Schools: A Study of the Student Characteristics, School
Finance, and School Performance in Schools Operated by K12 Inc, NATIONAL
EDUCATION POLICY CENTER 2 (2012) http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/
understanding-improving-virtual.
11
See Vanourek & Evergreen Education Group, supra note 3.
8
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entire state.12 In fact, it is possible that by 2019 fifty percent of all
courses in the United States in elementary through high school will
be virtual.13 Most of the full-time virtual schools in the country are
charter schools.14 In fact, charter schools were “early adopters” of
virtual schools.15
Virtual schools are typically held wholly on the Internet, giving
students the opportunity to attend classes from anywhere with
online access. 16 Virtual education could potentially expand a
school’s geographic range such that it avails students of
educational opportunities they might not otherwise have in their
local communities.17 Margaret Lin, first executive director of the
National Association of Charter School Authorizers (“NACSA”),
aptly described the nature of virtual schools:
Indeed, the way to think about a virtual charter school is simply to
think of a “regular” charter school and remove the building: swap in a

12

Id.; Luis A. Huerta et al., Cyber and Home School Charter Schools:
Adopting Policy to New Forms of Public Schooling, 81 PEABODY J. EDUC. 103,
104-05 (2006). Gary Miron et al., Full-Time Virtual Schools: Enrollment,
Student Characteristics, and Performance, NAT’L EDUC. POL’Y CTR. 25 (2013),
http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/nepc-virtual-2013.pdf (stating that virtual schools
“now constitute one of the fastest-growing forms of school choice” and that “an
increasing number of district and state education agencies are now starting fulltime virtual schools”). See also Anthony G. Picciano & Jeff Seaman, K-12
Online Learning: A 2008 Follow-Up Of The Survey of US School District
Administrators,
THE
SLOAN
CONSORTIUM
(2009),
http://olc.onlinelearningconsortium.org/publications/survey/k-12online2008.
13
Courtney B. Myers, Clayton Christensen: Why Online Education Is Ready
For Disruption, Now, THE NEXT WEB, INC. (2011), http://thenextweb.com/
insider/2011/11/13/clayton-christensen-why-online-education-is-ready-fordisruption-now/.
14
Vanourek & Evergreen Education Group, supra note 3.
15
Id.
16
See Kara Page, The Advantages of Virtual School, EHOW.COM,
http://www.ehow.com/list_5965288_advantages-virtual-school.html; see also
Ableidinger et al., supra note 3; see also Miron et al., supra note 12.
17
Lin, supra note 3, at 1–2.
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computer instead and the Internet connection becomes thebus”
transporting students to school.18

III.
INSTRUCTIONAL METHODS USED BY VIRTUAL SCHOOLS
The four dominant methods of instructional delivery in virtual
schools are: independent; asynchronous; synchronous; and a
combination of asynchronous and synchronous.19 The independent
model is similar to a traditional correspondence course except that
the computer mediates the education experience.20 Students teach
themselves or are taught by their parents, with minimal teacher
involvement.21
Most virtual schools in the United States use the asynchronous
delivery model.22 The asynchronous instructional approach differs
from the independent delivery model in that there is more
interaction between teachers and students.23 Teachers also serve a
more active role, “guiding the students through the curriculum and
serving as the source of both formative and summative evaluation
of the student’s work.”24 However, students still have a great deal
of independence in that they work through the online curriculum at
their own pace. 25 Asynchronous classes use direct messaging
(“DM”); discussion boards such as whiteboard (“WB”) and social

18

Id. at 2. See also Jason Ohler, Why Distance Education?, 514 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 22, 24 (1991) (“[I]nformation is transported, not
people; students stay put and school comes to them.”).
19
See generally Huerta et al., supra note 12 (discussing the various methods
of instructional delivery). See also June Ahn, Policy, Technology, and Practice
in Cyber Charter Schools: Framing the Issues, 113 TEACHERS COL. REC. 1, 5
(2011).
20
See generally Huerta et al., supra note 12.
21
Id.
22
Michael Barbour, Today’s Student and Virtual Schooling: The Reality, the
Challenges, the Promise, 13 J. OF DISTANCE LEARNING 5, 14 (2009).
23
Michael K. Barbour & Thomas C. Reeves, The Reality of Virtual Schools:
A Review of the Literature, 52 COMPUTERS & EDUC. 402, 405 (2009).
24
Id. at 406.
25
Id.

DEC. 2015]

Virtual Schools, Student Rights

229

networking, such as blogs, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter to
increase collaboration and learner interaction.26
The synchronous approach requires students and teachers to be
online simultaneously.27 Synchronous courses may also use chat
rooms that allow people to interact through texting.28 Additionally,
students could be connected to instructor presentations through
telecommunication technology (video conferencing) or the Internet
(web conferencing or “webinars”). 29 In some cases, live video
interactions between students and teachers are coupled with
computer simulations, virtual personas, and instruction.30
Under the fourth method of delivery, virtual schools use a
combination of synchronous and asynchronous educational
approaches.31 Michael Barbour provides an example of how virtual
schools in remote regions of Canada apply a combination of
synchronous and asynchronous approaches:32
[The schools provide] synchronous instruction using the voice over
Internet protocol software, Elluminate Live®. This software allows for
two-way voice over the Internet, a shared, interactive whiteboard,
instant messaging, application sharing, breakout rooms, and interactive
quiz and surveymanagement. . . . The asynchronous instruction is
conducted using a course management system called WebCT®. This
26

Barbour & Reeves, supra note 23 at 405. Synchronous vs. Asynchronous
Classes, ELEARNERS.COM, available at http://www.elearners.com/onlineeducation-resources/online-learning/synchronous-vs-asynchronous-classes/
[hereinafter Synchronus vs. Asynchronus].
27
Synchronous vs. Asynchronous, supra note 26; Huerta et al., supra note 12.
28
Synchronous vs. Asynchronous, supra note 26; Huerta et al., supra note 12
at 110.
29
Synchronous vs. Asynchronous, supra note 26.
30
Christopher J. Dede, Emerging Technologies: Impacts on Distance
Learning, 514 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 146, 151 (1991); Kim et
al., supra note 3 at 530. Complex content can be presented through a variety of
media including animations, audio and video recordings, visual images, quiz
banks, virtual social lounge, virtual labs, PowerPoint and other text. Id. Students
can also have live conversations with researchers working on a scientific
research vessel or other experts globally. Hawkins, supra note 2, at 160 (1991).
31
See generally Huerta et al., supra note 12. See also Ahn, supra note 19, at
5.
32
Michael Barbour, Portrait of Rural Virtual Schooling, 59 CANADIAN J. OF
EDUC. ADMIN. & POLICY 1 (2007).
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software provides the teacher and students with a variety of tools,
including: a discussion forum, a shared calendar, an internal e-mail
system, and aplace to house the course web pages.33

Even in a virtual school environment, with or without teacher
supervision, student behavior must be regulated so that it does not
disrupt learning. As Judge Jordan of the United States Court of
Appeals, Third Circuit, observed, “[m]odern communications
technology, for all its positive applications, can be a potent tool for
distraction and fomenting disruption.”34
IV.
ENFORCEMENT OF STUDENT BEHAVIOR
In order to limit the disruption to the learning environment,
public schools, including virtual schools, provide guidance for
student behavior with respect to educational technology through
student code of conduct policies.35 These codes of conduct often
incorporate acceptable use policies (“AUPs”). 36 AUPs inform
students about permissible and impermissible uses of educational

33

Id. at 10–11. (2007).
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 222 (3d
Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., concurring).
35
Georgia
Dep’t
of
Educ.,
Student
Codes
of
Conduct,
http://www.gadoe.org/Curriculum-Instruction-and-Assessment/Curriculum-andInstruction/Pages/Student-Code-of-Conduct.aspx (last visited June 21, 2015).
Student codes of conduct identify acceptable and unacceptable behavior in a
school. Id. They also outline possible consequences for violations. Owensboro
Public Schools, 2015-2016 Code of Acceptable Behavior and Discipline,
http://www.owensboro.kyschools.us/discipline_handbook.pdf (last visited Oct.
19, 2015).
36
Patrick D. Paukin, Morse v. Frederick and Cyber-bullying in Schools: The
Impact of Freedom of Expression, Disciplinary Authority, and School
Leadership, in TRUTHS AND MYTHS OF CYBER-BULLYING: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON STAKEHOLDER RESPONSIBILITY AND STUDENT SAFETY 159,
160 (Shaheen Sharif & Andrew H. Churchill, eds.) (2009).
34
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technology.37 They emphasize to students that use of the school’s
server and technology system is a privilege rather than a right.38
AUPs are designed to protect the school from educational
disruption and to preclude or minimize student exposure to danger
and hurtful information online while harnessing opportunities for
digital learning.39 Violations of the AUP can result in disciplinary
action such as suspension, expulsion, litigation and termination of
the student’s access to the school’s server and technology system.40
37

Philip T.K. Daniel & Silas McCormack, Technological Advances, Student
Expression, and the Authority of Student Officials, 248 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP.
553, 574 (2009).
38
See, e.g., Clark Cty Sch. Dist., Acceptable Use Policy,
http://ccsd.net/district/acceptable-use-policy/ (last visited June 21, 2015); Austin
ISD, Austin Independent School District Acceptable Use Guidelines,
https://www.austinisd.org/sites/default/files/dept/technology/docs/AU_Guidelin
es_20131206.pdf (last visited June 21, 2015); Greenville County Schools,
Greenville
County
Schools
Acceptable
Use
Policy
(AUP),
http://www.greenville.k12.sc.us/Departments/main.asp?titleid=etsaup (last visited
June 21, 2015).
39
James Bosco, Rethinking Acceptable Use Policies to Enable Digital
Learning: A Guide for School Districts, COSN 2–3 (March 2013),
http://www.cosn.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Revised%20AUP%20March%20201
3_final.pdf (last visited June 16, 2015).
40
Owensboro Public Schools, supra note 35 at 26; Louisiana Virtual School,
Acceptable Use Policy, LA VIRTUAL SCH. 2009-2010, 1–2 (2010), available at
http://publications.sreb.org/2009/LVSAcceptableUse.pdf (last visited June 21,
2015); Greenville County Schools, Greenville County Schools Acceptable Use
Policy (AUP), available at http://www.greenville.k12.sc.us/Departments/
main.asp?titleid=etsaup (last visited June 21, 2015); The School District of
Philadelphia, ACCEPTABLE USE OF INTERNET, SCH. DIST. OF PHILA.
OPERATIONS 1, 11 (2014), available at http://www.philasd.org/offices/
administration/policies/815.pdf; Austin ISD, Austin Independent School District
Acceptable Use Guidelines 1, 2, available at https://www.austinisd.org/sites/
default/files/dept/technology/docs/AU_Guidelines_20131206.pdf (last visited
June 21, 2015); see Michigan Virtual School, Acceptable Use Policy, MICH.
VIRTUAL SCH. (2015), available at http://www.mivhs.org/Students/GettingStarted/Acceptable-Use-Policy (last visited June 16, 2015) (“Any user accounts
found to be violating these service limitations will be terminated without
warning or recourse at the sole discretion of MVU [Michigan Virtual
University] . . . In such cases, where an account is terminated for service
violations as detailed in this or the following two sections; no refunds or credit
will be offered, and the User acknowledges that their account termination may
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Use of the school’s technology is often conditioned on parent
and/or student signed consent to comply with the AUP’s terms.41
Even when the signed consent is not imposed as a condition of use,
schools generally require parent and/or student signatures
affirming understanding of and consent to the terms of AUP.42
result in course failure as well as other disciplinary action.”). Michigan Virtual
School’s policy also includes the following disciplinary terms:
Any user’s failure to abide by the MVS [Michigan Virtual School]
Acceptable Use Policy could result in any or all of the following actions:
A.The immediate removal of the user’s access to all MVS instructional
computing resources.
B. The immediate removal of the user from their course(s) and termination
of any teaching assignment(s).
C. The involvement of law enforcement agencies and subsequent legal
action.
Michigan Virtual School, Acceptable Use Policy, MICH. VIRTUAL SCH. 1, 4-5
(2015), available at http://www.mivhs.org/Students/Getting-Started/AcceptableUse-Policy (last visited June 16, 2015). See also Clark County School District,
Acceptable Use Policy, available at http://ccsd.net/district/acceptable-usepolicy/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2015) (“The system administrators reserve the right
to terminate access to the District’s computer network resources if this AUP is
violated while using real-time chat features, including video conferencing.”).
41
See, e.g., Louisiana Virtual School, supra note 40 at 2 (“No student will be
allowed to participate in the Louisiana Virtual School unless a completed (and
appropriate)Internet Usage Contract has been submitted to both the Louisiana
Virtual School and the student’s home district.”); see also Florida Virtual
School, Student and Parent Handbook, FLA VIRTUAL SCH 2015-16, 63 (2015),
http://www.flvs.net/myFLVS/student-handbook/Documents/Student_Parent_Ha
ndbook.pdf (providing that infringing students “may be refused participation in
Florida Virtual School [FLVS] courses.”).
42
For a sample AUP contract requiring student and parent acknowledgement
of understanding and consent to the AUP’s terms, see LA Virtual School, supra
note 40. See also Virginia Department of Education, STUDENT AND PARENT
HANDBOOK: VIRTUAL VIRGINIA 13 EDUC. 12 (2014), available at
http://www.virtualvirginia.org/students/handbook/downloads/student_handbook.
pdf (last visited June 21, 2015) (“Each student will acknowledge his/her
willingness to abide by Virtual Virginia’s Acceptable Use Policy . . . “). See also
id. at 17 (“STUDENTS ACCEPT THE TERMS OF THIS ACCEPTABLE USE
POLICY BY CLICKING AN AGREEMENT BEFORE THEY ACCESS
THEIR COURSE CONTENT FOR THE FIRST TIME.”); SCH. DIST. OF PHILA.
OPERATIONS, ACCEPTABLE USE OF INTERNET, COMPUTERS AND NETWORK
RESOURCES
4–5
(2014),
http://www.philasd.org/offices/administration/
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The AUP of the Owensboro Kentucky School District is
typical for public schools. 43 The Owensboro School District
provides “students access to electronic information, including the
Internet and email, through a service called OPS Net.”44 Students
have access to OPS Net both at home and at school.45 The AUP
provides that “[s]chool district personnel have the right to access
information stored in any user directory, on the current user screen,
or in electronic mail.”46 Thus, “[s]tudents should not expect files
stored on District servers or through District provided or
sponsored technology services to be private.”47
The Owensboro AUP also provides that students will use its
computing resources lawfully and respectfully.48 For instance, the
AUP prohibits students from using the district’s electronic services
for creating, distributing, accessing or obtaining information that is
prejudicial, sexually explicit, discriminatory, harassing, disruptive
to learning or bullies other students.49 Many public virtual schools
have AUPs governing student computing behavior similar to that
of Owensboro school district set forth above. The Agora Cyber
Charter School’s AUP, for instance, warns that the failure to
follow the guidelines set therein could result in removal of the
student’s access to the school’s instructional computing services,
suspension or expulsion; or “[i]nvolvement with law enforcement
policies/815.pdf (last visited June 22, 2015) (“By accessing the district’s Internet
. . . computers and network resources . . . users acknowledge awareness of the
provisions of this policy and awareness that the district uses monitoring systems
to monitor and detect inappropriate use and may use tracking systems to track
and recover lost or stolen equipment.”).
43
All virtual schools covered in this Article are public schools.
44
Owensboro Public School, supra note 35 at 26.
45
Id.
46
Id. See also CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, supra note 40 (stating that
“[e]lectronic mail is not private.. . . . As with written communication . . . users
should recognize there is no expectation of privacy for electronic mail.”).
FLORIDA VIRTUAL SCHOOL supra note 41 (“Email is not private. Never say
anything via email that you wouldn’t mind seeing on the school bulletin board
or in the local newspaper.”).
47
Owensboro Public School, supra note 35 at 26. (emphasis in original).
48
Id. at 27.
49
Id.
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agencies and possible legal action.”50 Among other things, Agora’s
AUP requires parents and students to follow “netiquette” or
network etiquette in communicating with others online.51 The AUP
states that students should “[n]ever use derogatory comments,
including those regarding race, age, gender, sexual orientation,
religion, ability, political persuasion, body type, physical or mental
health, or access issues.”52 Students are also warned that swear
words are unacceptable.53
Louisiana Virtual School’s AUP, on the other hand, prohibits
“sites that contain obscene, pornographic, pervasively vulgar,
excessively violent, or sexually harassing information or
material.”54
Even as virtual schools attempt to regulate student speech, it is
important that they comply with the dictates of the First
Amendment.
V.

VIRTUAL SCHOOLS AND THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE

A. Case Law
As public schools, virtual public schools must comply with the
Free Speech Clause when regulating student expression.55 While
the United States Supreme Court has never ruled on online
on-campus or off-campus student speech, in a quartet of cases, the
Court has held that schools may punish student speech in certain
situations. These cases are Tinker v. Des Moines Independent

50

Agora Cyber Charter School, 2011-2012 SCHOOL HANDBOOK 42 (2011),
http://agora.k12start.com/images/schools/2011-12_Agora_Student_Handbook_
FINAL_11-14-11_-_4-20-12_COA.pdf. Agora Cyber Charter School is a public
virtual school for Pennsylvania students.
51
Id. at 43.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Lousiana Virtual School, supra note 40.
55
Lisa M. Pisciotta, Beyond Sticks & Stones: A First Amendment Framework
For Educators Who Seek To Punish Student Threats, 30 SETON HALL L. REV.
635, 648 (2000).
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Community School District; 56 Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser;57 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier;58 and Morse v.
Frederick. 59 This section examines whether virtual schools can
restrict online student speech (on-campus and off-campus) under
the quartet of United States Supreme Court cases governing the
student-speech jurisprudence.
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
In this case, three students filed a First Amendment claim
against their school district after school officials suspended them
for refusing to remove black armbands they wore to school in
protest of the Vietnam War.60 Prior to the students wearing their
armbands to school, school officials learned of the planned
armband protest and preemptively passed a policy authorizing
officials to discipline students who failed to comply with school
demands to remove their armbands.61 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa ruling that school officials
acted constitutionally since they were trying to avoid disruption at
the school. 62 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
whether the First Amendment permits school officials to censor
student speech that disrupts a school.
This was the Supreme Court’s first ever decision about the
First Amendment free speech rights of students. Consequently, the
Court started by acknowledging that students have First
Amendment rights in public schools. Specifically, the Court
declared that “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”63 This talismanic statement,
which recognized a schoolhouse gate, has appeared in almost every
56

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
58
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
59
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
60
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 504–05.
63
Id. at 506.
57
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student speech case since then.64 The metaphoric schoolhouse gate
demarcates the boundaries between on-campus speech and offcampus speech. The statement implies that students do not lose
their free speech rights simply because they step beyond the
schoolhouse gate onto school grounds. Even though the Court did
not have occasion to address online speech, it is evident today that
“Tinker’s ‘schoolhouse gate’ is not constructed solely of the bricks
and mortar surrounding the school yard.”65 Therefore, Tinker and
its mandates arguably apply to virtual public schools. Besides, as
public schools, virtual schools are subject to the First Amendment.
The Tinker Court ruled, however, that students’ rights within
the school are not as broad as those outside the school because of
the need for order and discipline at school. 66 Accordingly, the
Court created the material and substantial disruption test for
determining when schools can discipline students for speech. 67
This test provides that school officials can discipline students for
their speech if there is actual, or reasonable forecast of, material
and substantial disruption.68 The Supreme Court has never required
a “magic number of students or classrooms that must be affected
by the speech” in order to satisfy the material and substantial
disruption test.69 Instead the test is based on a case-by-case factual
inquiry.70
64

See, e.g., Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 1988); Beussink v.
Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F.Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Killion
v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Mardis
v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 684 F.Supp.2d 1114, 1117 (E.D. Mo. 2010);
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 212 (3d Cir.
2011); Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 (N.D. Miss.
2012).
65
Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216.
66
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505–08.
67
Id. at 509. This test is also simply referred to as the Tinker test.
68
See id. at 512–14.
69
J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094,
1111 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
70
Id. See also Todd D. Erb, A Case for Strengthening School District
Jurisdiction to Punish Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
257, 266 (2008) (“There is not a precise test for what defines a substantial

	
  

DEC. 2015]

Virtual Schools, Student Rights

237

The Tinker Court warned school officials to avoid disciplining
students on the basis of “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance.” 71 Besides, “school officials cannot suppress
‘expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to
contend.’” 72 The unpleasantness, unpopularity, controversy, or
discomfort of speech is not a constitutional basis for disciplining
students for speech. 73 Students also cannot be restricted to
officially-sanctioned speech.74
The Court held that the students in Tinker could not be
disciplined for their armbands because their speech did not actually
materially and substantially disrupt the school, and there was no
basis to reasonably forecast material and substantial disruption.75
The Court reasoned that only a very small proportion of the 18,000
students wore the armbands.76 Furthermore, the armbands did not
instigate any violence or threats at the school.77 The Court also
ruled that the fact that student speech generates discussion outside
the confines of a classroom is not alone sufficient ground for
discipline.78 In the context of virtual schools, the classroom could
be the learning management system or other mediating technology
used to congregate students for a class session.
disruption . . . but courts have reasoned that there must be more than some mild
distraction or curiosity created by the speech . . . but complete chaos is not
required . . . . In determining the magnitude of the disruption . . . courts will
consider factors such as: the reaction of the students and teachers to the speech,
whether any students or teachers had to take time off from school because of the
speech, whether teachers were incapable of controlling their classes because of
the speech, whether classes were cancelled, and how quickly the administration
responded to the speech . . . . If the court does find that the Internet speech
actually disrupted or foreseeably could have disrupted the school’s learning
environment, the administration’s disciplinary measures will most likely be
upheld.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
71
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
72
Id. at 511 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
73
See Id. at 509–10.
74
Id. at 511.
75
Id. at 508–10.
76
Id. at 508.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 514.
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As mentioned earlier, the rules above could certainly apply to
off-campus speech as well as online speech. Although there is
some language in Tinker that may lead to the conclusion that the
case controls only speech on school grounds,79 the authors found
language, in various parts of the Tinker case, indicating that the
rules from Tinker could govern any speech; thus encompassing
both off-campus speech and online speech. For instance, the Court
stated that the rules were “not confined to the supervised and
ordained discussion which takes place in the classroom.” 80
Additionally, the Court stated that “[a] student’s rights, therefore,
do not embrace merely the classroom hours.”81

79

This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that each of the four cases that the
Supreme Court has been presented involved a different context of student
speech; and in each case, the Court created a different test. These cases are
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); and Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393
(2007). Consequently, it is inferable that the Court will establish a different test
when confronted with its first off-campus student speech case or its first online
student speech case. Moreover, one of the Court’s first statements to begin its
analysis in Tinker specifically honed in on the on-campus focus: “Any word
spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the
views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance . . . . But
our Constitution says we must take this risk.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (emphasis
added) (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)). The geographic
locations identified in this contextual statement portend an on-campus scope for
the subsequent analysis in the Tinker case.
80
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
81
Id. This statement, which potentially implies that the Court extended Tinker
rules and reasoning far beyond the classroom and even beyond the schoolhouse
gate, was however qualified by the immediate subsequent statement: “When he
is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the
authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects
like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without ‘materially and substantially
interfere[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of
the school’ and without colliding with the rights of others.” Id. at 512–13 (citing
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). This statement leaves one
with the impression that the Supreme Court limited the Tinker rules and
reasoning as well as the material and substantial disruption test to on-campus
speech.
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Still, other statements in the case suggest that Tinker
encompasses all student speech. For example, the Supreme Court
ruled that:
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.82

The key phrase that implies an off-campus reach is “in class or
out of it.”83 This phrase could mean outside the classroom but
within the schoolhouse gate; or any geographic location beyond
the classroom, including off-campus.84 Further, the Court stated
that “we do not confine the permissible exercise of First
Amendment rights . . . to supervised and ordained discussion in a
school classroom,”85 implying an off-campus reach similar to the
previous statement. Moreover, since online student speech often
constitutes speech beyond the “supervised and ordained discussion
in a school classroom,”86 the Court’s statement could be interpreted
to mean that students have free speech rights in online forums.
Nevertheless, what is clearly evident is that the Supreme Court did
not expressly settle or even address whether Tinker governs offcampus speech or online speech as those were not the facts of the
case before the Court. As such, we are only left to interpret the
Court’s, at times, inconsistent statements above.
2. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser
In Bethel, a student filed suit against the school district
claiming that the district violated his First Amendment rights by
disciplining him for using graphic sexual metaphors in a speech
82

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added).
Id.
84
See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837–38
(N.D.Miss. 2012), aff’d in part rev’d in part by Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd.,
774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2014) (interpreting the phrase to mean that “the U.S.
Supreme Court in Tinker specifically ruled that off-campus conduct causing
material or substantial disruption at school can be regulated by the school.”).
85
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
86
Id.
83
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supporting a schoolmate’s candidacy for an elected office.87 The
speech, delivered at a mandatory school assembly attended by
about 600 fourteen-year old high school students, garnered
reactions from some students who graphically simulated the sexual
references in the speech while others loudly expressed derision or
yelled.88 School officials suspended the student based on a school
policy barring student use of obscene language.89 The United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington as well as
the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit held that the
discipline violated the student’s free speech rights under the First
Amendment, primarily because the speech did not cause material
and substantial disruption at the school. 90 The Supreme Court
reversed the lower court decisions.91
The Court explained that political speech—the form of speech
in Tinker—must be treated differently from sexual speech.92 While
political speech must be accorded the highest protection in schools
in the absence of material and substantial disruption, sexual speech
is readily subject to censorship because of the need for sensitivity
to student sensibilities in schools.93 Further, while our democratic
society encourages expression of divergent and controversial
views, we place trust in schools to teach and develop students in
the socially appropriate norms and decorum in expressing in such
views.94 Consequently, even if vulgar and offensive language is
uncensorable for adults, it can be censored for students particularly
87

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–79 (1986).
Id. at 678. The speech, which left some students startled, was delivered
against the admonition of teachers. Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 680.
92
Id. at 680–81.
93
Id. at 680.
94
Id. at 681–83 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508) (“The inculcation of these
values is truly the ‘work of the schools..’”); see also Id. at 684 (“[S]chools must
teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order. Consciously or
otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older students—demonstrate the
appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and
deportment ina ando out of class.”).
88
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when they are in a school.95 The Court ruled that school officials
can censor student speech that is lewd, plainly offensive, vulgar or
obscene. 96 This is the Bethel test. 97 Applying this test to the
student’s speech in the case, the Court ruled that school officials
could censor the speech because its glorification of male sexuality
was plainly offensive to teenage girls and lewd.98
The context of this case indicates that the Bethel test and
Court’s reasoning in the case only apply to on-campus speech.
Specifically, the speech was delivered at a school assembly, which
was an on-campus setting. Moreover, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that if the student “delivered the same speech in a
public forum outside the school context, it would have been
protected.” 99 Therefore, applying the Bethel decision to an offcampus context or an online context, neither of which was present
in Bethel, might be taking the decision out of context.100 The Court
seemed to emphasize an on-campus focus in stating that the
“constitutional rights of students in public school are not
95

Id. at 682 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–342 (1985))
(“[T]he constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”).
96
Id. at 683–84. This is not only because of the school’s role as an institution
of learning but also because of the youth and immaturity of students exposed to
such language. Id. at 680.
97
It can also be referred to as the Fraser test – the other short form of the case
name.
98
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 478 U.S. at 683–85.
99
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007).
100
Some language from the case indicates that the Court limited school
officials’ authority to censor lewd, plainly offensive, vulgar or obscene student
speech to on-campus settings. Accord J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch.
Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The School District’s argument fails at
the outset because Fraser does not apply to off--campus speech. Specifically in
Morse, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, emphasized that [h]ad
Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it
would have been protected.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Morse,
551 U.S. at 405; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)). For instance, in
justifying its decision to create the Bethel test, the Court declared that “[t]he
determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly
is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.” Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403,
478 U.S. at 683 (emphasis added).
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automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings.” 101 This language suggests that students have
constitutional rights that are coextensive with those of adults in
settings beyond the public school.102 Further language in the case
could imply that schools have authority to censor students’ offcampus speech. For example, the Court declared that
“[c]onsciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older
students—demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and
political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of
class.”103 The “in and out of class” reference could either mean in
and out of class on school grounds; or it could refer to any place
outside the class, which would encompass off-campus locales.
Additionally, the Court stated “it is a highly appropriate function
of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and
offensive terms in public discourse.” 104 This authorization of
censorship over student public discourse was not explicitly
restricted to on-campus discourse; nor was it restricted to offline
speech. Thus, the authorization could be interpreted to include offcampus and online discourse.
However, it would be fantastic to imagine that the Court
granted unbridled school authority over student public discourse
irrespective of location and connection to the school. After all, the
Court ruled in Tinker, “[s]chool officials do not possess absolute
101

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 478 U.S. at 682 (emphasis added) (citing New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340–42).
102
See J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 932 (“Specifically in Morse, Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, emphasized that [h]ad Fraser delivered
the same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would have
beenp protected. The Court’s citation to the Cohen decision is noteworthy. The
Supreme Court in Cohen held, in a non-school setting, that a state may not make
a single four-letter expletive a criminal offense . . . Accordingly, Chief Justice
Roberts’s reliance on the Cohen decision reaffirms that a student’s free speech
rights outside the school context are coextensive with the rights of an adult.”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). See also J.S. ex rel. Snyder,
650 F.3d at 932 (“Fraser’s ‘lewdness’ standard cannot be extended to justify a
school’s punishment . . . for use of profane language outside the school, during
non--school hours.”).
103
Bethel. Sch. Dist. No. 403, 478 U.S. at 683 (emphasis added).
104
Id.
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authority over their students.”105 Therefore, even if Bethel applies
to off-campus speech106 courts must require a significant nexus to
the campus in order to avoid convoluting the distinction between
off-campus and on-campus speech. As for online speech, the only
reason not to extend Bethel to such speech is the context of Bethel:
Bethel involved offline speech. Even though the context of Bethel
was offline speech, the language of Bethel nevertheless suggests
that the decision could be interpreted as applicable to online
speech. This is, for instance, evident in the Court’s declaration that
“[t]he determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or
in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school
board.”107 In this statement, there is no distinction between online
speech and offline speech. In all, from our discussions above, one
could surmise that Bethel applies online and offline but not offcampus. However, of the Supreme Court’s quartet of cases,
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 108 , discussed next,
provides the clearest limitation of school censorship authority to
the confines of the campus and thus on-campus speech.
3. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
In Hazelwood, student staff members of a newspaper,
published as part of a journalism class, sued their school district
alleging that school officials’ censorship of two articles in the
paper violated their First Amendment free speech rights.109 One of
the articles addressed the effect of divorce on students while the
other detailed three students’ experiences with pregnancy.110 The
officials reasoned that the articles compromised the confidentiality
and identities of the students and family members covered.111 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
105

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969).
106
As evident above, on the whole, Bethel does not appear to apply to offcampus speech, however.
107
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 478 U.S. at 683.
108
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
109
Id. at 262, 264.
110
Id. at 263.
111
Id. at 262–63.
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refused to enjoin the censorship because the newspaper was part of
a class. 112 The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
reversed, ruling that the articles could not be censored unless
school officials satisfied the material and substantial disruption
test.113 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if school
officials could censor student speech in school publications
without violating the First Amendment.114
The Supreme Court ruled that school officials may censor
school-sponsored student speech—student speech that the public
might reasonably view to bear the school’s imprimatur. School
officials can censor such speech as long as they can show that the
censorship was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical
concern. 115 This is the Hazelwood test. Under this test, school
officials can censor school-sponsored speech to ensure that
students learn the curriculum, to protect students’ emotional
maturity, and to address students’ grammatical errors, bias, or
profanity.116 The Court ruled that, since the newspaper was part of
a class and had not been opened to indiscriminate use, it was a
closed public forum and as such school-sponsored speech that the
school could censor.117
While the medium for the speech in the Hazelwood case was a
hard copy newspaper (as opposed to the Internet), the medium did
not play a dispositive role in the Court’s decision. Further, since
schools can sponsor speech online or offline (e.g., the newspaper
in Hazelwood), the Hazelwood test, which governs schoolsponsored speech, should extend online even though it does not
extend off-campus.
While the context of Hazelwood clearly suggests it only has
on-campus reach, the Court also prominently stated that “[a]
school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its
112

Id. at 264–65.
Id. at 262–63.
114
Id. at 266.
115
Id. at 271, 273.
116
Id. at 272.
117
Id. at 267.
113
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‘basic educational mission,’ even though the government could not
censor similar speech outside the school.” 118 This statement
suggests that school officials do not have unbridled power over
students outside the schoolhouse gate. Per contra, since the schoolsponsored nature of speech was the dispositive factor in
Hazelwood, and school-sponsorship of speech is borderless,
presumably the Hazelwood test could be stretched for an offcampus reach.119 Indeed, in Morse v. Frederick,120 discussed next,
the Court affirmed this limited reach in stating “Kuhlmeier
acknowledged that schools may regulate some speech even though
the government could not censor similar speech outside the
school.”121
4. Morse v. Frederick
This was the last student-speech case decided by the Supreme
Court. 122 As in the prior cases, the speech occurred offline. 123
However, unlike the prior cases, which literally occurred on school
grounds, the speech in Morse occurred outside the confines of
school grounds.124
In Morse, a student filed a First Amendment claim against the
school district alleging a violation of his right to free speech after
he was suspended, pursuant to the school’s policy against
advocacy of illegal substances, for unfurling a banner which read
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” as the Olympic Torch Relay proceeded
on the street in front of his school.125 The school also rationalized
118

Id. at 266 (emphasis added) (citing Bethel School District No. 403, 478
U.S. at 685).
119
Beyond these observations, there is no indication in the case that the Court
intended for the test to apply off-campus.
120
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
121
Id. at 405–06 (internal quotation marks omitted).
122
See id.
123
See generally Id.
124
Id. at 396.
125
Id. at 397–99. School officials approved the commercially-sponsored (as
opposed to school-sponsored) event as a class trip though students were under
no obligation to attend the event. The event was neither funded nor coordinated
by the school. Id.
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the discipline as punishment for unfurling the banner at a schoolsanctioned event during school hours.126 At the time, the student
was standing outside school grounds on the public sidewalk across
the street from the school.127 Indeed, the principal had to cross the
street onto the public sidewalk to confront the student.128 Despite
the fact that the event was not mandatory, school officials
monitored students in attendance. 129 The United States District
Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment,
finding no First Amendment infringement.130 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that
school officials failed to satisfy the material and substantial
disruption test.131 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether the First Amendment protected the student’s banner.132
The Supreme Court chose to create a new test for determining
when school officials can censor student speech.133 This test, the
Morse test, provides that school officials can censor student speech
126

Id. at 398; see also id. at 398–99 (“The common sense understanding of
the phrase ‘bong hits’ is that it is a reference to a means of smoking marijuana.
Given [Frederick’s] inability or unwillingness to express any other credible
meaning for the phrase, I, I can only agree with the principal and countless
others who saw the banner as advocating the use of illegal drugs. [Frederick’s]
speech was not political. He was not advocating the legalization of marijuana or
promoting a religious belief. He was displaying a fairly silly message promoting
illegal drug usage in the midst of a school activity, for the benefit of television
cameras covering the Torch Relay. [Frederick’s] speech was potentially
disruptive to the event and clearly disruptive of and inconsistent with the
school’s educational mission to educate students about the dangers of illegal
drugs and to discourage their use.”).
127
Id. at 397-99. In fact, the student with the banner was late that day and did
not enter the school’s physical premises; instead he went straight across the
street from the school. Id.; Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115-17 (9th Cir.
2006).
128
Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.
129
Id. at 397–98.
130
Id. at 399.
131
Id. at 399–400.
132
Id. at 400, 403.
133
Id. at 404–06. The Court also found the prior tests—Tinker, Bethel and
Hazelwood—insufficient for addressing the gravity of drug threats to students.
Id. at 408–09.

DEC. 2015]

Virtual Schools, Student Rights

247

that advocates illegal drug use.134 The Court reasoned that drugs
present such great danger to students that speech advocating their
use cannot be tolerated in schools.135 Accordingly, school officials
can take steps to deter a student culture of drug abuse by censoring
advocacy of drugs.136 Even when the speaker does not intend to
advocate illegal drug use through the speech, school officials can
censor the speech if they reasonably interpret it to advocate illegal
drug use.137
The Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that this case was
an off-campus speech case because it occurred outside school
grounds.138 The Court explained that the speech was delivered at a
school-sanctioned event that took place during school hours.139
Moreover, the supervisory presence of school officials, as well as
the presence of other students, brought the location across the
street within the ambit of the schoolhouse gate. 140 The Court
declared that a student “cannot stand in the midst of his fellow
students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and
claim he is not at school.”141 Beyond the supervisory and student
presence requirements, however, the Court failed to define what
process schools must follow in order to sanction an event for
purposes of the First Amendment. Conceivably, schools can
sanction events post-hoc in order to justify censorship of offcampus student speech—a dangerous proposition.142 Despite this
134

Id. at 408.
Id. at 407.
136
Id. at 407.
137
Id. at 401, 408.
138
Id. at 400–01.
139
Id. at 401.
140
Id. at 400–01.
141
Id. at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court effectively
empowered schools to sanction events that they do not sponsor if they want to
extend their censorship beyond the schoolhouse gate. Thus non-schoolsponsored speech can still be censored at school-sanctioned events that occur
even off-campus.
142
This is a dangerous proposition since it is in effect a grant of unwieldy
power to schools to censor student speech through manipulation of the
sanctioned nature of events.
135
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grant of expansive school power, the Court acknowledged that
there is incertitude in the scope of its student-speech precedents.143
Thus, there is no certainty that the precedents apply to off-campus
speech.144 Further, “the very fact that the Supreme Court created a
new basis for restriction of student speech – rather than trying to
shoehorn the [Morse] case into Tinker, Fraser, or Hazelwood . . .
suggests that other . . . [tests] may subsequently be recognized as
well.”145
VI.

VIRTUAL SPEECH AMIDST THE AMBIVALENCE IN THE
STUDENT-SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
The earlier discussion of the United States Supreme Court’s
student-speech precedents reveals that the Court has yet to review
a case involving virtual student speech.146 The Court’s silence has
fueled the uncertainty of both administrators and school officials
regarding how to handle virtual student speech. Lower courts have
likewise struggled to determine which of the student-speech tests
should govern virtual student speech.147 Indeed, the law has failed

143

Morse, 551 U.S. at 401. Recall, the Supreme Court’s student-speech
precedents factually only involved on-campus speech.
144
See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist.,
494 F.3d 34, 39, n.3 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Since the Supreme Court in Morse rejected
the claim that the student’s location, standing across the street from the school at
a school approved event with a banner visible to most students,, was not ‘at
school,’ it had no occasion to consider the circumstances under which school
authorities may discipline students for off--campus activities.” (internal citations
omitted)). See also D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754, 761
(8th Cir. 2011) (“In none of these cases [Tinker, Bethel, Hazelwood and Morse]
was the Court faced with a situation where the First Amendment question arose
from school discipline . . . for conduct outside of school.”).
145
Emily G. Waldman, A Post-Morse Framework for Students’ Potentially
Hurtful Speech (Religious and Otherwise), 37 J.L. & EDUC. 463, 489 (2008).
146
See supra Part V.
147
See Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III, Censorship and Student
Communication in Online and Offline Settings (2015) (extensively discussing
lower courts’ struggles), available at http://www.igi-global.com/book/censorshipstudent-communication-online-offline/134799 (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
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to catch up with technology. 148 Nonetheless, according to the
Supreme Court, it is indisputable that the First Amendment applies
to virtual speech.149
In the cases that have reviewed virtual student speech, Tinker’s
material and substantial disruption test has emerged as the favorite
test.150 Courts use the material and substatial disruption test as the
default test when resolving virtual student speech cases because
such cases do not precisely fit the factual contexts of the Supreme
Court’s student-speech precedents. 151 Rather than investigating
whether the Supreme Court intended the material and substantial
disruption test to apply to off-campus speech, some courts simply
assume its applicability. 152 When courts choose to apply the
material and substantial disruption test, they are more likely to find
school censorship of student speech unconstitutional because of the
requirement to prove substantial disruption.153

148

Christopher E. Roberts, Is Myspace Their Space?: Protecting Student
Cyberspeech In A Post-Morse v. Frederick World, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1177,
1181 (2008).
149
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
150
LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988– 89 (9th Cir. 2001); O.Z. v.
Bd. of Trs. of Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 08–5671 ODW, 2008 WL
4396895, 4 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 9, 2008); Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136
F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F.
Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000); accord Douglas D. Frederick,
Restricting Student Speech That Invades Others’ Rights: A Novel Interpretation
Of Student Speech Jurisprudence In Harper v. Poway Unified School District,
29 U. HAW. L. REV. 479, 487 (2007).
151
Accord J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301
(3d Cir. 2010); Boucher v. School Bd. of Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821,
827–28 (7th Cir. 1998); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960,
970 (5th Cir.1972); T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807
F.Supp.2d 767, 781 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
152
See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 926.
153
Frederick, supra note 150 at 497. See also Leora Harpaz, Internet Speech
And The First Amendment Rights Of Public School Students, 2000 B.Y.U.
EDUC. & L.J. 123, 128 (2000) (characterizing the substantial-disruption
requirement as a “significant burden”).
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The first lower court case to rule on the virtual speech rights of
students was Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District.154 In that
case, a student was disciplined for creating a website that used
vulgar and boorish language to criticize his principal, teachers, and
the school’s website.155 The student challenged the discipline as a
violation of his First Amendment rights.156 The website solicited
readers to send their critical comments about the school to the
principal. 157 The website was created on the student’s home
computer, outside school hours, and without using school
resources. 158 The student’s website included a hyperlink to the
school’s website; however, the student did not intend for anyone at
the school to see his website.159
No one accessed the website at the school until the student’s
friend reported the website to a teacher.160 The friend discovered
the website while using the student’s personal computer at the
student’s home.161 The student neither authorized nor knew of his
friend’s access of the website.162 Furthermore, the website caused
no disruption at the school.163
The student, unclear about his free speech rights, approached
the school’s civics teacher to inquire about whether he could be
disciplined for his speech.164 The teacher’s response exemplifies
the typical confusion of school officials regarding the scope of
students’ First Amendment rights; she simply stated that “she did
not know.”165 The federal district court, however, tried to bring
clarity to the jurisprudence. Specifically, the court decided that the
material and substantial disruption test should govern online
154

30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
Id. at 1177.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 1177–78.
162
Id. at 1178.
163
Id. at 1179–80.
164
Id. at 1179.
165
Id.
155
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speech since the other tests in existence at the time, the Bethel and
Hazelwood tests, did not contextually fit this virtual speech case.166
The court found that upset feelings and disapproval of the
website’s content, rather than material and substantial disruption,
motivated the suspension.167 Consequently, school officials had no
authority to censor the speech.168
The court failed to provide a rationale for extending judicial
authority into the realm of off-campus speech other than ruling that
the material and substantial disruption test is the default test when
no other test is applicable to student speech. A review of the
decision, however, suggests that the court likely found the
following connections between the speech and the school
paramount and sufficient to create a nexus justifying application of
the material and substantial disruption test to off-campus speech:
(1) the website criticized school officials; (2) the website was
hyperlinked to the school website; (3) and the website was
accessed at school by the student’s friend and school officials.169
The court relied on these weak connections, rather than requiring
that the speaker actually bring the off-campus speech to school or
affirmatively facilitate its on-campus presence. In essence, while
courts may choose to apply the material and substantial disruption
test to off-campus speech, they may also rely on weak connections
between off-campus speech and the campus in order to bring the
off-campus speech within the Supreme Court’s student-speech
precedents.
A. Distinguishing On-Campus from Off-Campus Virtual Speech
With the advancement of technology, we are likely to continue
to see students capitalize on technology to find ample opportunities

166

Id. at 1180, n. 4 (showing the court chose the material and substantial
disruption test despite acknowledging that the Supreme Court has varied its First
Amendment student-speech jurisprudence based on the form of the student
speech).
167
Id. at 1180–81.
168
Id. at 1180–82.
169
Harpaz, supra note 153, at 148.
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to misbehave. 170 School officials driven to regulate the student
behavior are faced with the challenge of determining whether they
can censor off-campus speech. Research shows that school
officials are more inclined to punish off-campus speech that
criticizes school officials as opposed to speech expressing a
political or other viewpoint off-campus.171 This shows that school
officials censoring students tend to be thin-skinned.
On-campus speech clearly falls within the Supreme Court’s
student-speech precedents; thus, such speech is readily subject to
censorship pursuant to the quartet of student-speech tests.172 As
discussed previously, the lack of Supreme Court precedent on offcampus student speech leaves school officials in a gray area as to
whether they can regulate off-campus speech.173 In virtual schools,
it is difficult to determine what constitutes off-campus speech
versus on-campus speech. The ubiquity of the Internet makes the
distinction between on-campus speech and off-campus speech
elusive.174 This elusiveness could make it difficult for courts and
school officials to determine when to apply the Supreme Court’s
170

See generally Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No.415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272
(W.D. Wash. 2007); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV.
61 (2009). See also Pisciotta, supra note 55, at 661–62 (“The Internet, however,
has also presented students with an unprecedented opportunity to candidly
ridicule their schools and teachers.”).
171
Aaron H. Caplan, Public School Discipline For Creating Uncensored
Anonymous Internet Forums, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 161 (2003).
172
See generally Oluwole & Green, supra note 147, at 62–121 (2015)
(extensively discussing lower courts’ struggles), available at http://www.igiglobal.com/book/censorship-student-communication-online-offline/134799 (last
visited Oct. 31, 2015).
173
See supra Section V.
174
This is particularly so because of the far-reaching scope of the internet that
makes it difficult to define geographical boundaries of speech. As the Supreme
Court observed, “[t]his dynamic, multifaceted category of communication
includes not only traditional print and news services, but also audio, video, and
still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue. Through the use of chat
rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages,
mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a
pamphleteer.” Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
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student-speech precedents. 175 Judge Jordan of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit described this challenge
adeptly:
[f]or better or worse, wireless internet access, smart phones, tablet
computers, social networking services like Facebook, and stream-ofconsciousness communications via Twitter give an omnipresence to
speech that makes any effort to trace First Amendment boundaries
along the physical boundaries of a school campus a recipe for serious
problems in our public schools.176

In virtual schools, the campus could include the schoolprovided laptop, Internet access, server, and the learning
management system, as well as the video and audio system used
for class sessions. As such, off-campus will be areas outside these
examples. What constitutes virtual off-campus could also change
temporally. In other words, during the hours of using a school
laptop (or other school technology resource) for educational
purposes, the student will be on-campus. Outside those times, the
student would be deemed off-campus.
Unfortunately, there is a very sparse jurisprudence on the
distinction between virtual off-campus and on-campus speech.177
One case that has considered this distinction is Requa v. Kent
School District No. 415.178 The student in that case, in concert with
classmates, allegedly recorded his teacher twice, furtively, and
posted the video on YouTube.179 He also included a link to the
YouTube video on his personal MySpace webpage. 180 The
175

See, e.g., D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754, 765 (8th
Cir. 2011) (“The widespread use of instant messaging by students in and out of
school presents new First Amendment challenges for school officials. Instant
messaging enables student messages to be rapidly communicated widely in
school and out. School officials cannot constitutionally reach out to discover,
monitor, or punish any type of out of school speech.”).
176
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir.
2011) (Jordan, J., concurring).
177
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002).
178
Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No.415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1272 (W.D.
Wash. 2007).
179
Id. at 1274. We use “allegedly” because the court found that there was
dispute as to the student’s level of involvement in the recording. Id. at 1274–75.
180
Id. at 1274.
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recording included critical comments about the teacher’s
hygiene.181 It also showed a student thrusting his pelvic toward the
teacher while holding two fingers above the back of the teacher’s
head (rabbit ears).182
A section of the video, preceded by the warning “Caution
Booty Ahead” (and accompanied by a song titled “Ms. New
Booty”), showed several shots of the teacher’s buttocks while
bending over or walking.183 While the filming occurred on campus
during school hours, the editing and YouTube posting occurred
off-campus after school hours.184 The school computers blocked
access to YouTube, so no student accessed the video on a school
computer.185 However, a local television station found the video
while researching a news story on students’ use of YouTube to
criticize teachers and informed the school.186 School officials chose
to suspend the student even though the video caused no actual
disruption at the school.187 The student filed a First Amendment
claim against the school district challenging the discipline for his
speech.188
School officials contended, and the court agreed, that the
student was disciplined for his on-campus filming rather than the
off-campus video editing and YouTube posting. 189 The court
reasoned that school officials did not require the student to remove
the YouTube link from his MySpace page; nor did they bar the
student from re-posting the link after the student voluntarily
removed it.190 Furthermore, school officials did not discipline other
students who posted a link to the YouTube video on their MySpace
181

Id.
Id. at 1274, 1279.
183
Id. at 1274.
184
Id. at 1275–76.
185
Id. at 1274.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 1274–75. The student served his suspension in contract school, an
interim placement where a student works on school assignments from home
with aid of a tutor. Id. at 1276.
188
Id. at 1275–76.
189
Id. at 1275.
190
Id. at 1278.
182
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pages. 191 In other words, school officials only disciplined the
student for his on-campus speech. By isolating the on-campus
filming from the off-campus expressive actions of the student, the
court was able to avoid confronting the uncertainty in the scope of
the Supreme Court’s student-speech precedents.
In essence, if school officials can limit their discipline to the
on-campus portion of a student’s expression, then any pertinent
test among the four student-speech tests will be readily applicable
to the speech. In this particular case, the court chose to apply the
Bethel test as well as the material and substantial disruption test.192
The court determined that the filming of the pelvic thrust, the
teacher’s buttocks, and the rabbit ears, as well as the “Caution
Booty Ahead” graphic and the song, constituted lewd and plainly
offensive speech under the Bethel test.193 Therefore, the speech was
censorable. 194 The court reached this conclusion despite
acknowledging that “[t]he facts of this case are not on all fours
with Fraser in the sense that the ‘speech’ at issue here was
ultimately published in an off-campus forum (i.e., the Internet).”195
To rationalize its decision, the court underscored the fact that
school officials successfully isolated the on-campus speech from
the off-campus speech:
[b]ut an inseparable part of the speech which Plaintiff seeks to protect
is the filming of the footage in the classroom. That is an inextricable
part of the activity which comprises the “speech” of the completed
video and, in singling out that discreet portion of the “speech” for
punishment, Defendants have localized the sanctionable behavior to the
area in which their authority has been upheld by the Supreme Court.196

The court concluded that school officials could also discipline
the student under the material and substantial disruption test, even
though the video caused no actual disruption at the school.197 The
court explained that the filming of a teacher’s buttocks, rabbit ears,
191

Id.
Id. at 1279–81.
193
Id. at 1279.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 1280.
196
Id.
197
Id.
192
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and pelvic thrust was a demeaning, sexually suggestive action;
accordingly, it constituted a per se disruption of the school’s
culture of respect among teachers and students.198 The court chose
to apply the material and substantial disruption test because it is
the “catch-all” test when other student speech cases do not neatly
fit the case under consideration.199 As long as the Supreme Court
fails to rule on which test should govern off-campus speech, the
inclination toward the material and substantial disruption test will
continue.200
It appears that if virtual schools can separate the on-campus
components of speech from the off-campus components, they will
have an easier constitutional route to censorship under one of the
student-speech tests. If the off-campus and on-campus speech
components are inseparable, courts are less likely to sanction
censorship unless the speech has some connection to the campus.
When off-campus speech has a cognizable connection to the
campus (such as where off-campus virtual speech is brought on
campus), courts will be inclined to bring the speech within the
ambit of the Supreme Court’s student-speech precedents.
B. Off-Campus Virtual Speech Brought On Campus
Sometimes courts have to determine whether speech occurring
outside the schoolhouse gate, but with an effect on campus,
constitutes on-campus speech or off-campus speech. This was the
issue in J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District.201
In this case, while off-campus at a local restaurant, a student
recorded her friends calling a classmate a “slut,” “spoiled,” and
“the ugliest piece of shit I’ve ever seen in my whole life.”202 One of
the friends also accused the classmate of speaking about

198

Id.
Id. (citing Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3rd Cir.
2001)).
200
J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094,
1102–03 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
201
Id. at 1100.
202
Id. at 1098.
199
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“boners.”203 As the student recorded the scene, she could be heard
cheering on the off-color comments.204 She posted the video on
YouTube using her personal computer. 205 She then informed
several students and the classmate targeted in the video of the
YouTube link.206 The classmate, who was very upset about the
video and had to undergo counseling, reported the video to school
officials.207 The school blocked student access to YouTube and
other social networking site so only school officials watched the
video on campus. 208 Nonetheless, school officials required the
student to delete the video from both YouTube and her personal
computer.209 She was also suspended for two days.210 Consequently,
she filed a First Amendment claim against the school district
challenging the discipline.211 The court had to “determine the scope
of a school’s authority to regulate speech by its students that
occurs off campus but has an effect on campus.”212 In this case, the
on-campus effects of the off-campus speech included: (1) the
school visit by the upset parent of the targeted student to complain
about the speech; (2) the counseling for the targeted student; and
(3) the student’s temporary refusal to go into his classroom.213
The court observed that “many other courts analyzing offcampus speech that subsequently is brought to campus or to the
attention of school authorities apply the substantial disruption test
from Tinker without regard to the location where the speech
originated (off campus or on campus).”214 Indeed, the court noted
203

Id.
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 1099.
209
Id. at 1099–1100.
210
Id.
211
Id. at 1100.
212
Id. at 1098.
213
Id. at 1117.
214
Id. at 1103. In other words, a number of courts see the material and
substantial disruption test as borderless; and are willing to disregard the oncampus context of Tinker. See id. at 1104 (“In these cases, the courts have
204
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“the substantial weight of authority indicates that geographic
boundaries generally carry little weight in the student-speech
analysis.”215 If geographical boundaries are discounted, then the
lack of Supreme Court precedent on off-campus speech, or virtual
speech, becomes highly insignificant or even immaterial in
student-speech cases.216 Accordingly, the court chose to apply the
material and substantial disruption test to the YouTube video.217
However, the court found no evidence of substantial disruption at
the school; instead, the court noted the effects of the speech at the
school such as the upset parent of the target student, the
counseling, and temporary refusal by the targeted student to enter
the classroom were de minimis.218 Moreover, the court ruled that
the need to guard students’ emotional maturity from criticisms
does not satisfy the material and substantial disruption test:
Indeed, no one could seriously challenge that thirteen-year-olds often
say mean-spirited things about one another, or that a teenager likely
will weather a verbal attack less ably than an adult. The Court accepts
that C.C. was upset, even hysterical, about the YouTube video, and that
the School’s only goal was to console C.C. and to resolve the situation
as quickly as possible. Unfortunately for the School, good intentions do
not suffice here. Defendants have failed to present sufficient evidence
that the YouTube video caused a substantial disruption to school
activity on May 28, 2008. Further, Defendants’ fear that a substantial
disruption was likely to occur simply is not supported by the facts.219

Looking beyond the material and substantial disruption test, the
court concluded that the Bethel test was inapplicable because that

directly applied the Tinker substantial disruption test to determine if a First
Amendment violation occurred, without first considering the geographic origin
of the speech.”).
215
Id. at 1104.
216
Id. at 1107.
217
Id. at 1109; see also id. at 1110 (“[T]he Court finds that the YouTube
video clearly falls into the ‘all other speech’ category, governed by Tinker.”).
218
Id. at 1117–22; see id. at 1119 (“For the Tinker test to have any reasonable
limits, the word ‘substantial’ must equate to something more than the ordinary
personality conflicts among middle school students that may leave one student
feeling hurt or insecure.”).
219
Id. at 1122.
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test is “limited to speech that occurs in school.”220 Moreover, the
court was “not aware of any authority from the circuit courts
applying Fraser to speech that takes place off campus.”221 The
Morse test was not applicable because the YouTube video did not
advocate illegal drug use; and the Hazelwood test was inapplicable
because the speech was not school-sponsored.222
The court emphasized that school officials must not “become
censors of students’ speech at all times, in all places, and under all
circumstances.”223 If it is established that a student had no intention
of bringing off-campus speech to the campus, or the student takes
steps to ensure that the speech does not get to the campus, the
Supreme Court student-speech precedents would be inapplicable to
the off-campus speech.224
C. Location As Context and the Nexus Requirement for Virtual
Speech
Despite the fact that a number of courts insist on ignoring the
on-campus context of the Supreme Court’s precedents when
applying those precedents to off-campus speech, some courts
220

Id. at 1109; see Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla.
2010) (finding the context of online speech distinct from a school assembly in
Bethel and noting that “[f]or the Court to equate a school assembly to the entire
internet would set a precedent too far reaching”). See also Scott A. Moss, The
Overhyped Path From Tinker To Morse: How The Student Speech Cases Show
The Limits Of Supreme Court Decisions—For The Law And For The Litigants,
63 FLA. L. REV. 1407, 1446 (2011) (describing the distinction between the
captive audience of Bethel and the internet which generally involves students
accessing and then voluntarily navigating in order to be exposed to content).
221
J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F.Supp.2d 1094,
1110 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Moreover, the reasoning of Fraser, which is anchored
in the school’s duty to teach norms of civility to its students, does not support
extending Fraser to lewd or offensive speech occurring off campus. For these
reasons, the Court will not apply Fraser to Plaintiff’s YouTube video.”).
222
Id. at 1109.
223
Id. at 1110, n.8 (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist.,
607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979)).
224
Id. at 1098, 1107–09 (stating the student in this case did not meet this
standard, however, since she told other students of the video and asked them to
watch it on YouTube).
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consider the context critical. 225 These courts require that the
location of the speech must be a threshold determination before
deciding applicability of the Supreme Court’s student-speech
precedents.226 These cases tend to extend the precedents to offcampus speech only if it has a nexus to the school.227 Wisniewski v.
Board of Education of the Weedsport Central School District228 is a
prime example. The student in the case used a firing pistol as his
AOL Instant Messaging (IM) identifier icon when communicating
from his home computer.229 The pistol was directed at a human
head that had dots signifying blood splatter above it. 230 The
following phrase, targeting the student’s English teacher, appeared
below the head: “Kill Mr. VanderMolen.”231 This icon was visible,
for at least three weeks, during IM exchanges with about fifteen
people on the student’s buddy list, which included some
classmates.232 A student who was not on the list reported the icon
to the English teacher who in turn informed school
administrators.233 The student-speaker was first suspended for five
days and then for one semester. 234 School officials granted the
distressed teacher’s request to no longer teach the student.235 The
student filed suit against the school district claiming that the
discipline for his speech violated his First Amendment right to free
225

See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 931 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011).
J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094,
1104 (C.D. Cal. 2010). See Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370 (S.D.
Fla. 2010) (“Where the speech occurs should be determined at the outset in
order to decide whether the ‘unique concerns’ of the school environment are
implicated.”).
227
See, e.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir.
2011).
228
494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.2007).
229
Id. at 35.
230
Id. at 36.
231
Id.
232
Id. at 36, 39. The buddy list is a group of people that a message sender on
IM chooses to communicate with in real time.
233
Id. at 36.
234
Id. at 36–37. A police investigation and a psychologist evaluation revealed
that the student meant the icon as a joke. Id. at 36.
235
Id. at 36.
226
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speech.236 The district court ruled for the school district and the
student appealed.237
Although the court of appeals acknowledged a distinction
between off-campus speech and on-campus speech, it ruled that the
material and substantial disruption test can be extended to offcampus speech if the speech has a nexus to the school.238 That
nexus is established when the speech is reasonably foreseeable to
come to the attention of school officials.239 The court reasoned that
it would be unwise to wholly foreclose school censorship of offcampus speech because, in some instances, such speech could
“create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a
school.”240 The court chose the material and substantial disruption
test as the governing test for determining the constitutionality of
school censorship of off-campus virtual speech because, of the
student-speech tests, the material and substantial disruption test is
the only one that embodies a nexus.241
Another case that recognized a distinction between off-campus
and on-campus speech and imposed a nexus requirement is
Doninger v. Niehoff.242 In this case, a student council member, in
concert with other students, sent out mass emails to community
members asking them to intervene in the scheduling of an annual
band concert.243 The students objected to school officials’ plans to
move the location of the event, a change that could have threatened
the scheduled date of the event.244 As a result of the mass emails,
school officials received a flood of emails and calls supporting the
students.245 The student council member posted the following on a
236

Id. at 37.
Id.
238
Id. at 39.
239
Id.; D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 766–67 (8th
Cir. 2011).
240
Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39.
241
Id.
242
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
243
Id. at 44–45.
244
Id. at 44.
245
Id.
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262

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 221

publicly-accessible blog, after school hours, using her personal
computer:
Jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. here is an
email that we sent to a ton of people and asked them to forward to
everyone in their address book to help get support for jamfest.
Basically, because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz is getting a TON of
phone calls and emails and such. we have so much support and we
really appreciate it. however, she got pissed off and decided to just
cancel the whole thing all together. anddd so basically we aren’t going
to have it at all, but in the slightest chance we do it is going to be after
the talent show on may 18th. anddhere is the letter we sent out to
parents.246

The student also posted a copy of the mass email on the public
blog. 247 School officials were displeased at the misleading and
vulgar nature of the blog and disciplined the student.248 The student
filed a First Amendment claim against the school district.249 The
district court ruled for the school district and the student
appealed.250
The court of appeals acknowledged that the emergence of
virtual student speech has made geographical location elusive.251
Nonetheless, geographical location is important; for as the court
noted, had the student used language such as “douchebags” on
campus, school officials could have readily censored the speech
under the Bethel test.252 The court, however, refused to resolve
246

Id. at 45.
Id.
248
Id. at 45–46. It was misleading to claim that the event had been canceled as
this is completely false. Id. at 51. The principal asked the student to write an
apology letter, show her mother the blog and withdraw from the Senior Class
Secretary election. Id. at 46. The student complied with these disciplinary
sanctions with the exception of the candidacy withdrawal. Even though school
officials prevented her name from getting on the ballot, she got a plurality of the
votes. Despite her election, school officials did not allow her to assume the
Senior Class Secretary position. Id.
249
Id. at 47.
250
Id. at 43.
251
Id. at 48–49.
252
Id. at 49 (The Bethel test (also known as the Fraser test) empowers school
officials to censor plainly offensive, lewd, vulgar and obscene student speech.).
247
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whether the Bethel test could be extended to off-campus speech.253
Instead, the court viewed the material and substantial disruption
test as the established test for off-campus speech with a caveat.254
Specifically, the court ruled that a nexus is created to allow
censorship under the test if off-campus speech is reasonably
foreseeable to reach the campus.255 Further, a nexus is created if the
speech is reasonably foreseeable to cause substantial disruption on
campus. 256 The blog posting satisfied the requisite nexus
requirements as the posting showed that the student intended to stir
up community members to call and email the school.257 The blog
also included misleading and vulgar language designed to rile
people to oppose school officials, potentially undermining the
good faith efforts of school officials for an amicable solution.258
Consequently, a nexus was established.259
Also in J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, 260 the court
made analysis of speech location a threshold requirement in
student-speech cases; and required a nexus between off-campus
speech and the campus before extending the Supreme Court’s
precedents to off-campus speech.261 In J.S., a student created a
253

Id. at 50 (“We need not decide whether other standards [besides the
material and substantial disruption test] may apply when considering the extent
to which a school may discipline off-campus speech.”); see also id. at 49 (“It is
not clear, however, that Fraser applies to off-campus speech.”).
254
Id. at 50. As discussed earlier herein, the material and substantial
disruption test is the Tinker test.
255
Id. at 50–51, see also S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch.
Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing D.J.M., 647 F.3d at 766)
(“Tinker applies to off-campus student speech where it is reasonably foreseeable
that the speech will reach the school community and cause a substantial
disruption to the educational setting.”).
256
Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50.
257
Id. at 50–51.
258
Id.; see also id. at 51–52 (stating that the student’s “conduct posed a
substantial risk that LMHS administrators and teachers would be further
diverted from their core educational responsibilities by the need to dissipate
misguided anger or confusion over Jamfest’s purported cancellation.”).
259
Id. at 51–52.
260
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
261
Id.

264

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 221

website called “Teacher Sux” that included a disclaimer warning
visitors not to disclose the site or the student’s identity to school
officials.262 The website, created on his home computer after school
hours, included vulgar and threatening words, sound clips, pictures
and animation targeting his principal and algebra teacher.263 One of
the webpages accused the principal, in vulgar terms, of having
sexual relations with another principal.264 The webpages targeting
the teacher profanely attacked her physique and disposition.265 The
website also showed the teacher in a witch costume with her face
morphing into Adolf Hitler’s.266 Additionally, the student called for
the teacher’s termination.267
The most disturbing webpage titled “Why Should She Die?”
solicited twenty dollars from visitors to pay for a hitman to kill the
teacher.268 The page identified the following as reasons for the
teacher to die: “(1) Is it a rug, or God’s Mistake? (2) Puke Green
Eyes (3) Zit! and (4) Hideous smile.”269 On that webpage, the
student also repeated the following statement 136 times: “F ___
You Mrs. Fulmer. You Are A B ____. You Are A Stupid B
____.”270 A final page depicted the teacher’s severed head with
trickles of blood.271 The student informed some of his schoolmates
of the website and even showed it to one of them while at school.272
When the principal learned of the website, he contacted the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the police as he considered the threats
serious.273 No charges were filed, however.274
262

Id. at 850–51. The disclaimer indicated that visitors clicking on the website
were committing to these terms. Id. at 851.
263
Id.
264
Id.
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
Id.
269
Id. at 851 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also id. at 858.
270
Id. at 851.
271
Id.
272
Id. at 852.
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Id.
274
Id.
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The algebra teacher lost weight, appetite, and sleep as a result
of the website and could not complete the school year. 275 She
feared that she would indeed be killed.276 In fact, the school needed
three substitute teachers to fill in for the algebra teacher. 277
According to school officials, the website significantly impacted
school morale, akin to a student or teacher’s death.278 The student
received a three-day suspension, which was subsequently extended
to ten days and then expulsion. 279 The student filed suit against the
district claiming that the discipline violated his First Amendment
right.280 Both the trial court and the appellate court ruled for the
school district and the student appealed to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania.281
The court ruled that the first step in any student-speech analysis
must be a determination of whether the virtual speech occurred oncampus or away from campus.282 According to the court, if speech
is on campus, the United States Supreme Court’s student-speech
precedents will easily apply. 283 If the speech is off-campus,
however, school officials must show a nexus between the offcampus speech and the campus in order for the speech to fall
within the ambit of the student-speech precedents.284 If a nexus is
found, the speech will be converted to on-campus speech for
275

Id.
Id.
277
Id.
278
Id. at 852.
279
Id. at 852–53.
280
Id. at 853.
281
Id.
282
See id. at 864 (“What can be said, based upon these student expression
cases, is that any constitutional analysis of a student’s freedom of speech must
include a number of considerations. First, a threshold issue regarding the
‘location’ of the speech must be resolved to determine if the unique concerns
regarding the school environment are even implicated, i.e., is it on campus
speech or purely off-campus speech?” (emphasis added)).
283
Id. at 864 (“[I]n attempting to discern the proper standard by which to
evaluate the School District’s discipline of J.S., we must first determine whether
the speech at issue was on-campus speech and thus, subject to United States
Supreme Court’s student expression case law.”).
284
Id. at 865.
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purposes of the First Amendment. 285 A nexus will exist if the
speech was accessed on campus, or if the speech was aimed at
students, teachers or others connected with the school.286
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that, in the case
before it, there was “a sufficient nexus between the web site and
the school campus to consider the speech as occurring oncampus.”287 The student created the nexus when he accessed the
website at the school.288 A nexus was also established when the
student shared the website with his schoolmates.289 Alternatively, a
nexus was created when school officials accessed the website on
the campus.290 A nexus was also created by the fact that the website
was aimed at people (the teacher and the principal) connected with
the school.291 The court declared that “where speech that is aimed
at a specific school and/or its personnel is brought onto the school
campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech will be
considered on-campus speech.”292
Even though the court found the website in the instant case to
be sophomoric and misguided, rather than a true threat, it ruled that
school officials could censor the speech under both the material
and substantial disruption test as well as the Bethel test.293 Rather
than simply choose one of the two tests, the court decided to apply
285

Id.
Id.; accord. S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696
F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e expect Tinker will apply here because the
Wilsons’ speech was, in the District Court’s words, ‘targeted at’ Lee’s Summit
North.”); cf. Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
(“Thus, the question is whether the fact that Plaintiff’s speech was arguably
aimed at a particular audience at the school is enough by itself to label the
speech on-campus speech. While further development of the facts may result in
a different determination, the Court finds that it is not.”).
287
J.S., 807 A.2d at 865.
288
Id.
289
Id.
290
Id.
291
Id.
292
Id. Some cases have explicitly ruled that school officials cannot censor offcampus speech is not accessed on campus. See, e.g., Evans v. Bayer, 684 F.
Supp. 2d 1365, 1371–72 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
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J.S., 807 A.2d at 860, 867–68.
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each test because the speech was both vulgar and disruptive.294 The
court explained that the facts of the case were not on all fours with
those of Tinker and Bethel so that made it even more prudent to
apply both tests (as opposed to just one).295 The court, however,
continued to express doubt about the applicability of the Bethel test
to the case. 296 The court was more comfortable applying the
material and substantial disruption test given that it is the choice
test for courts reviewing virtual off-campus speech. 297 This is
surprising because the United States Supreme Court has never
“considered whether Tinker applies to expressive conduct taking
place off of school grounds and not during a school activity and
has in fact noted that [t]here is some uncertainty at the outer

294

Id. at 867–68.
Id. at 867–68 (“The United States Supreme Court has not spoken in any
case involving facts that are analogous to this case. Although other lower courts,
in the context of Internet communication, have focused on Tinker, based upon
our prior discussion, we are not convinced that reliance solely on Tinker is
appropriate. Yet, whether the facts before us are more aligned with the events in
Fraser and governed by the lewd and plainly offensive speech analysis, or are
more akin to the situation in Tinker and thus subject to review for substantial
disruption of the work of the school, we need not definitively decide, for
application of either case results in a determination in favor of the School
District. Thus, we will first apply Fraser, and then Tinker to the facts sub
judice.”).
296
See id. at 868 (stating that “questions exist as to the applicability of Fraser
to the instant factual scenario.”). Other courts have found the Bethel test
inapplicable to off-campus speech. See, e.g., J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist.,
650 F.3d 915, 930–32 (3rd Cir. 2011); T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty.
Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 779 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
297
J.S., 807 A.2d at 865–68; accord J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 933
(“Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever allowed schools to punish
students for off-campus speech that is not school-sponsored or at a schoolsponsored event and that caused no substantial disruption at school. We follow
the logic and letter of these cases . . . An opposite holding would significantly
broaden school districts’ authority over student speech and would vest school
officials with dangerously overbroad censorship discretion.”).
295
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boundaries as to when courts should apply school speech
precedents.”298
Sometimes, courts chose to convert off-campus speech into oncampus speech by virtue of the fact that the speech is aimed at
persons at the school.299 In such a case, the United States Supreme
Court’s student-speech precedents would be applicable to the offcampus speech as with any on-campus speech.300 The conversion
of off-campus speech into on-campus speech is employed when
courts want to avoid resolving the difficult question of whether the
Supreme Court’s student-speech precedents should be applied to
off-campus.
When off-campus speech is not converted to on-campus
speech, the material and substantial disruption of the school,
caused by off-campus speech, can create a nexus with the school,
allowing school officials to censor the off-campus speech.301 This
was evident in O.Z. v. Board of Trustees of Long Beach Unified
School District302 where a student created, and posted on YouTube,
a slideshow dramatizing her teacher’s murder. The slides depicted
the teacher in a costume with red text describing the graphic
scene.303 On one slide that showed a butcher knife targeting the
teacher, the student wrote “Jelly Donut’s knife: haha fat bastard.
here i come!”304 The knife was placed on the slain image of the
teacher with the words “hehehe. i’m a shank yoooooooooo!”305 The

298

T.V. ex rel. B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 781 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Frederick v. Morse, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007); Porter v. Ascension Parish
Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n. 22 (5th Cir. 2004)).
299
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011).
300
Id.
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S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 776–
77 (8th Cir. 2012); O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs. of Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 2008
WL 4396895 at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236
F. Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2002); T.V. ex rel. B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at
788.
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O.Z., 2008 WL 4396895 at *1.
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slideshow ended with the phrase “your [sic] dead, BITCH!:D”.306
The teacher found the slideshow on YouTube, after googling her
name, and reported it to her principal.307 She found the video so
disturbing that she could not sleep for days and became sick.308 The
principal suspended the student and transferred her to another
school.309 The student filed suit against the school district claiming
an infringement of her First Amendment right to free speech.310
The court ruled that the material and substantial disruption test
governed since the case involved threatening speech that could be
reasonably forecasted to substantially disrupt the school.311 This
reasonable forecast, as well as the health impact on the teacher,
provided nexus to the school.312 Accordingly, the court concluded
that, even though the student “created the slide show off-campus, it
created a foreseeable risk of disruption within the school,”
justifying censorship of the speech.313
Legal scholar Leora Harpaz keenly observed the importance of
the nexus requirement in relation to virtual off-campus speech:
This situation has not arisen in any of the Supreme Court cases
reviewing public school student discipline in the face of First
Amendment challenges. In fact, the clear inference to be drawn from
the Court’s cases is that it is assuming the school’s authority over the
speech of its students ends as the student leaves the schoolhouse. To
overcome this inference, schools attempt to link the off-campus speech
to some on-campus event; either the speech reaches the campus
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Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1–2.
310
Id. at 2.
311
Id. at 2–3.
312
Id. at 3–4.
313
Id. at 4, 6. Accord Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370 (S.D. Fla.
2010) (“Student off-campus speech, though generally protected, could be
subject to analysis under the Tinker standard as well if the speech raises oncampus concerns.”); see also Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574
(4th Cir. 2011). (“At bottom, we conclude that the school was authorized to
discipline Kowalski because her speech interfered with the work and discipline
of the school.”).
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through some means or the off-campus speech has some effect oncampus.314

In sum, the above discussions show that the nexus of offcampus speech to the school is critical in determining whether
school officials can censor off-campus virtual speech.
D. Virtual Speech Not Using School Resources and Time
When determining whether school officials can censor offcampus student speech, courts sometimes examine whether the
student used school resources or time in creating the speech. This
played out, for instance, in Coy ex rel. Coy v. Board of Education
of North Canton City Schools.315 In this case, a student used his
personal computer to create a website after school hours in his
home.316 The student used no school resource or time in creating
the website. 317 The website had a section called “losers” that
included the pictures of, and insults targeting, three boys at the
student’s school. 318 Another section of the website included
vulgarity and a student displaying the “finger” gesture.319
Earlier in the school year, the student had signed the school
district’s acceptable use policy that prohibited students from
accessing websites with offensive language on school computers.320
A teacher expressed concern to the principal that the student might
be violating the policy after he was observed switching between
screens on the school computer.321 After the district technology
specialist searched the computer’s history, he determined that the
student had violated the policy by accessing the website on school
computer.322 School officials then suspended the student and later
314

Harpaz, supra note 153, at 142-43.
Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Canton City Sch., 205 F. Supp. 2d
791 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
316
Id. at 795.
317
Id.
318
In the case of one boy, the insult claimed that the boy was “sexually
aroused by his mother.” Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 795–96.
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Id. at 796.
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expelled him for eighty days for creating the website (as opposed
to the on-campus access of the website).323 The student filed a First
Amendment claim against the school district.324
The court chose to apply the material and substantial disruption
test to the off-campus speech.325 According to the court, the fact
that the student only “occasionally accessed his website in a
manner designed to draw as little attention as possible to what he
was viewing” made the case akin to Tinker’s silent and passive
speech.326 Although the student accessed the website on the school
computer, the court found it critical that the student did not show
the website to any other student.327 Most important to the court was
the fact that the student did not use school resources or time to
create the website which he merely surreptitiously accessed at the
school.328
Even though the student used vulgar language on the website,
the court opted not to apply the Bethel test because of the
contextual difference between the Bethel case and the case sub
judice: “Fraser involved graphic and explicit sexual speech to a
group of 600 students, not a student accessing a website he had
created.” 329 The Hazelwood test was inapplicable because the
speech was not school-sponsored speech as evident in the fact that
the student created the speech entirely on his own time with his
323

Id. See id. at 797 (“Earlier, the defendants explained their discipline as
resulting from the creation of the website, not the accessing of the website from
school.”). We add that the school later claimed that the discipline was for
accessing the site, though the court found evidence that the discipline was likely
for the content.
324
Id. at 797.
325
Id. at 800.
326
Id. (“Tinker’s holding that it is only appropriate to regulate ‘silent, passive
expression of opinion’ when the speech would ‘materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school’ is the proper standard for the Court to analyze the plaintiffs’ first
claim.”).
327
Id. at 799.
328
Id. (“Most important, Coy simply accessed his own website, a website he
created on his own time and with his own equipment.”).
329
Id.
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own resources and words. 330 Thus, when virtual speech is not
created using school resources or time, the Hazelwood test would
be inapplicable. Further, when the virtual speech involves
accessing a student’s own personal website, created without use of
school resources or time, it appears that Bethel would be
inapplicable.
E. Parodies
Students sometimes create virtual parodies that could present
First Amendment challenges for school officials. In order for
speech to be deemed a parody for purposes of the First
Amendment, it must be shown that no one would reasonably
believe that the speech is describing actual facts.331 There must also
be clear exaggeration in the speech to effect humor.332 Speech that
satisfies these requirements is protected under the First
Amendment.333
As in Barnett ex rel. Barnett v. Tipton County Board of
Education, students at times claim that their speech constitutes a
parody in order to avoid school discipline.334 In Barnett ex rel.
Barnett, students created fake MySpace profiles of the high school
coach and the assistant principal.335 The profile of the assistant
principal included his biography and photograph copied from the
district website.336 It also included sexual comments directed at
female students, leading a parent and reporter who discovered the
site to think that the assistant principal had been inappropriate with
students.337 The parent and the reporter notified school officials.338
330

Id. at 800.
Barnett ex rel. Barnett v. Tipton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 601 F. Supp. 2d 980,
984 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,
57 (1988)).
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The three students involved were given in-school suspensions.339
One of them also received a two-day suspension from school and
was sent to an alternative school for the rest of the school year.340
The students filed suit claiming that school officials violated their
First Amendment rights by disciplining them for their virtual
parodies.341 The court dismissed their claim because the profiles
were not clearly exaggerated.342 Further, visitors to the site, such as
the reporter as well as the parent, reasonably believed the profile
described actual facts.343 Besides, the MySpace profile used the
actual profile and biography from the district website, further
suggesting an authenticity to the profile.344 Additionally, there was
no humor to the profile.345 Consequently, students seeking parody
protection for virtual speech under the First Amendment need to
present strong evidence clearly showing that the speech is
indisputably humorous and fictitious.346
VII. ASSURING A COMMODIOUS VIRTUAL CAMPUS
Given that virtual students can complete their work at any time
of the day and on any day, it is difficult to delineate when students
are off-campus versus on-campus. This is amplified by the
integration of competency-based education (“CBE”) into virtual
education. CBE is an educational “approach [that] allows students
to advance based on their ability to master a skill or competency at
their own pace regardless of environment.”347 Virtual students may
be offline and yet be working on school assignments at home. Such
is the case with Connections Academy where elementary students
work on the computer for approximately ten percent of schooling
339
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Educause Library: Competency-Based Education (CBE), EDUCAUSE, at
http://www.educause.edu/library/competency-based-education-cbe (last visited
Oct. 9, 2015).
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time, middle school students for about thirty percent and high
schoolers for fifty percent.348
It is unclear whether schoolwork completed during the
traditional school hours of the weekday should constitute oncampus work just as it would in a brick and mortar school or
whether the work should be treated as homework that brick and
mortar school students complete at home after their school hours;
with the difference being that, for virtual students, those
“afterschool” hours could occur at any time of the day, once the
student is not actively engaged in instruction and learning on the
school’s learning management system or other platform. While the
United States Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he principal use to
which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during
prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities,”349
virtual schools do not necessarily have prescribed hours except for
synchronous sessions. Therein lies the challenge in deciphering the
scope of a school’s censorship authority under the First
Amendment. This is even more evident under the independent
instructional model where students have very little contact with
teachers and complete the lion’s share of their work in offline
settings.350
Historical practice dictates that students in brick and mortar
schools working offline, at home after school on homework, are
generally beyond the purview of the school since they are working
exclusively within the privacy of their homes. Unlike those
students, however, virtual schools generally reside inside the
virtual student’s home. All the student needs to do to engage is to
log on to the learning management system to connect with
curriculum content and, if synchronous, with an instructor. 351
Certainly, when the student is engaged with the learning
management system, the student is on the virtual campus.
348

Vanourek & Evergreen Education Group, supra note 3, at 7–8.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 512
(1969).
350
See supra Part III for a description of this model. See generally Ahn, supra
note 19; Huerta et al., supra note 12 (discussing instructional models).
351
See supra Part III for a description of synchronous delivery.
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Similarly, when the student is on any other online platform or
webinar for the virtual school, or using its video or audio system,
the student is on the virtual campus. To avoid any confusion about
the boundaries of the school, the school’s acceptable use policy
(“AUP”) should explicitly define the scope of the virtual campus.
Further, in order to enlarge the school’s censorship orbit in such a
way that a reviewing court might at least find an implicit virtual
campus, the AUP should also distinctly state that communications
on the learning management system are subject to monitoring and
censorship. Parents and students should be required to affirm
acknowledgement and consent to the policy with their signatures.
Virtual schools have an interest in the judiciary finding a broad
virtual campus and expansive classrooms, especially if courts are
reluctant to recognize broad school authority over off-campus
speech. After all, the Supreme Court has ruled that school officials
have censorship authority on campus; and in the classroom, school
officials have leeway to determine the manner of speech that is
appropriate.352
During the hours of virtual campus instructional and learning
sessions, students might engage in electronic utterances on sites or
platforms besides the school’s platforms or sites. The question
arises whether such electronic utterances outside of the school’s
platform constitute off-campus or on-campus speech. If the school
provides the computer and/or Internet access for the student’s
virtual schooling, then, arguably, the entirety of the student’s
communication on the computer or Internet access is on-campus
speech. This would encompass the electronic utterances outside of
the school’s platform occurring on the school-provided computer
and/or Internet access. To ensure that a court supports this
reasoning, the AUP needs to be very clear. The policy should
explicitly state that all communications on the computer and
Internet access (even those on non-school platforms) are subject to
the school’s purview and censorship with no right to privacy for
students on the school-provided technology.

352

Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
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Even when the school provides the computer, but not the
Internet access, the AUP should clearly state that, irrespective of
the source of the Internet access, all content on the school
computer is subject to inspection and censorship with no student
expectation of privacy. Where the AUP does not have such
language, or the student is using his home computer, the scope of
students’ First Amendment rights becomes less clear. Specifically,
when a virtual student makes electronic utterances on his personal
computer during synchronous school hours, are those electronic
utterances on-campus or off-campus speech?
As mentioned previously in the discussion of Requa v. Kent
School District No. 415353 in order to resolve this, the court would
try to isolate any on-campus component of the speech from its offcampus component. If the AUP is clear about the scope of the
virtual campus, and the computer or the Internet access is provided
by the school, the court will likely view the entire speech as oncampus speech. Furthermore, if the student used any element of the
school’s server, learning management system, platform, or video
or audio system for the electronic utterance, then that portion of the
utterance would be deemed to be on-campus speech and thus be
subject to censorship under one of the Supreme Court’s studentspeech precedents. If the student used his home computer when the
electronic utterance occurred, it might be more challenging to
isolate the on-campus component from the off-campus component.
As illustrated above, if the on-campus component cannot be
separated from the off-campus component of the utterance, courts
will look for a connection between the school and the speech to
determine if it is censorable. 354 Such connection would include
whether any component of the off-campus speech was brought to
353

492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1277–80 (W.D. Wash. 2007); see also supra Part
VI.A (discussing the judicial distinction of off-campus and on-campus speech).
354
D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754, 766–67 (8th Cir.
2011). See supra Part VI.C “Location As Context And The Nexus Requirement
for Off-Campus Virtual Speech” (discussing the judicial search for connection
between off-campus speech and the school’s campus). See also supra Part VI.B
“Off-Campus Virtual Speech Brought On Campus” (discussing the significance
of off-campus speech brought on campus).
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the virtual campus or was reasonably foreseeable to get to the
attention of school officials.355 If so, most courts apply the material
and substantial disruption test, irrespective of whether the speech
originated off-campus or on-campus.356
If the speech is reasonably foreseeable to cause a material and
substantial disruption within the virtual school, a nexus is created
between the speech and the virtual campus which brings the speech
within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s student-speech
precedents.357 A nexus is also created when the student shares the
speech with his virtual schoolmates or when school officials access
the speech on campus.358 Moreover, a nexus would be found if the
speech was directed at persons connected to the virtual school.359
Indeed, in such a case, the court might simply convert the offcampus speech into on-campus speech, making censorship under
the Supreme Court’s student-speech precedents more accessible
and accordant.360
These nexus rules similarly apply when the virtual student
communicates outside school hours without using any school
resources.361 In that situation, of the four student-speech tests, only
the material and substantial disruption test would be applicable.362
355

Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d
34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007)
356
J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094,
1103 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
357
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
358
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002).
359
Id. (“[W]here speech that is aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel
is brought onto the school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the
speech will be considered on-campus speech.”).
360
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011).
361
See Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Canton City Sch., 205 F. Supp.
2d 791, 795–97 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F.
Supp. 2d 1175, 1177–80 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
362
Coy ex rel. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 795-79. See also supra Part VI.D
“Virtual Speech Not Using School Resources and Time.” As noted in that
section, the Hazelwood test would be inapplicable because without school
resources or time, the speech would not constitute school-sponsored speech. The
Bethel test would be inapplicable because of a lack of contextual fit. See also
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Another consideration in determining the constitutionality of
school censorship of student speech is the forum of the speech.
VIII. PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS
The First Amendment accords different levels of protection to
speech based on the forum in which the speech occurs.363 In order
to determine the level of protection due, courts balance the
government entity’s “interest in limiting the use of its property to
its intended purpose [against] the interest of those wishing to use
the property for other purposes.”364 Nevertheless, “[i]n cases where
the principal function of the property would be disrupted by
expressive activity, the Court is particularly reluctant to hold that
the government intended to designate a public forum.”365 Based on
this balancing test, the Supreme Court has divided forums into four
categories: traditional public forums; designated public forums;
limited public forums; and non-public forums (closed forums).366
Speech in public parks, streets and sidewalks has the highest
level of protection because those are “places which by long
tradition or by government fiat [that] have been devoted to
assembly and debate.”367 According to the United States Supreme
Coy ex rel. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 799 (“Fraser involved graphic and explicit
sexual speech to a group of 600 students, not a student accessing a website . . .” ).
363
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
364
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985).
365
Id. at 804.
366
See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 37; Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of
the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 n.11
(2011) (discussing the various public forum categories).
367
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45; see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515
(1939) (“Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public
places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens.”); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (“No
particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a specific street is necessary; all
public streets are held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional
public fora.”).
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Court, public parks, streets and sidewalks are “quintessential
public forums.” 368 In such places, known as traditional public
forums, the government’s authority to censor speech is “sharply
circumscribed.” 369 In traditional public forums, content-based
censorship is prohibited unless the government shows that it has a
compelling reason for the censorship; and that the censorship is
narrowly tailored to the compelling reason. 370 Content-neutral
censorship371—related to time, place, and manner regulations372—is
permissible in traditional public forums if the government can
establish the following: (1) there is a significant government
368

Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
Id.; see also id. at 55 (“In a [traditional] public forum, by definition, all
parties have a constitutional right of access and the State must demonstrate
compelling reasons for restricting access to a single class of speakers, a single
viewpoint, or a single subject.”).
370
Id. at 45; see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980). This is the
strict scrutiny standard of review. According to the Supreme Court, “[a] statute
is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of
the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.” Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485 (citing City Council of
Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808–10 (1984)). See also
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (citing United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (“the requirement of narrow tailoring is
satisfied “so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. To be sure,
this standard does not mean that . . . regulation may burden substantially more
speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.
Government may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial
portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.”).
371
See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988) (citing Virginia Pharmacy
Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976))
(“‘[C]ontent-neutral’ speech restrictions [are] those that ‘are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech’”).
372
See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965) (quoting Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941)) (“It is, of course, undisputed that
appropriate, limited discretion, under properly drawn statutes or ordinances,
concerning the time, place, duration, or manner of use of the streets for public
assemblies may be vested in administrative officials, provided that such limited
discretion is exercised with uniformity of method of treatment upon the facts of
each application, free from improper or inappropriate considerations and from
unfair discrimination [and with] a systematic, consistent and just order of
treatment . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)).
369
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reason for the censorship; (2) the censorship is narrowly tailored to
the significant government reason; and (3) even with the
censorship, the government has left the speaker with sufficient
alternate avenues for the speech.373 Virtual schools are certainly not
traditional public forums since they have not been held in public
trust immemorially as forums for indiscriminate public use for
speech or assembly.374
Virtual schools could fall under one of three forum categories:
designated public forums, limited public forums, or non-public
forums (closed forums). 375 Non-public forums are government
properties that are neither immemorially, or by government
designation, forums for public debate and assembly. 376 In nonpublic forums, the government can reserve the forum for its
intended purpose, exclude speech or assembly, and discriminate
based on subject matter or speaker identity if the censorship is: (1)
reasonable, and (2) not designed to censor speech simply because
of the viewpoint expressed.377 The government can also censor
373

Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45; Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). See Ward, 491 U.S. at 802
(describing the alternate-avenue requirement by stating that the government
censorship “continues to permit expressive activity . . . and has no effect on the
quantity or content of that expression beyond regulating the extent of
amplification that the city’s limitations on volume may reduce to some degree
the potential audience for respondent’s speech is of no consequence for there has
been no showing that the remaining avenues of communication are
inadequate.”).
374
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267. (1988).
375
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267–77 (1981). Virtual schools cannot
be traditional public forums because they have not been held by long tradition in
trust for the public for debate and assembly. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
In fact, the Supreme Court has been very resistant to expanding traditional
public forums beyond public parks, streets and sidewalks, declaring that “[t]he
Court has rejected the view that traditional publicforumstatus extends beyond its
historic confines.” Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678
(1998).
376
See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46.
377
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
(internal citations omitted) (“Although a speaker may be excluded from a
nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the
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speech in non-public forums using reasonable time, place and
manner regulations. 378 According to the Supreme Court, the
government has increased censorship powers in non-public forums
because the government is entitled to reserve some of its properties
for specific purposes, which is similar to the right of private
property owners to reserve their properties for certain purposes.379
Otherwise, the functions of government will be compromised.380
A virtual public school is a non-public forum unless the school
has intentionally opened up the property, through practice or
policy, to the general public or to a part of the public for
indiscriminate use.381 “Publicly owned or operated property does
not become a public forum simply because members of the public
are permitted to come and go at will.”382 Accordingly, the mere fact
that students are allowed to use a virtual school’s learning
management system, video or audio system, discussion forums,
RSS feeds,383 blogs, podcasts, and wikis at convenient times when
purpose of the forum, or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose
especial benefit the forum was created, the government violates the First
Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of
view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject.”); see also Perry Educ.
Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46–49 (“Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the
right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker
identity. These distinctions may be impermissible in a public forum but are
inherent and inescapable in the process of limiting a nonpublic forum to
activities compatible with the intended purpose of the property. The touchstone
for evaluating these distinctions is whether they are reasonable in light of the
purpose which the forum at issue serves.”).
378
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46.
379
Id.; United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns., 453
U.S. 114, 129–30 (1981).
380
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966). See generally Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976).
381
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267–69
(1981). See also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (“The government does not create a
public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by
intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.”).
382
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
383
RSS is also referred to as Really Simple Syndication. See WHAT IS RSS?
RSS EXPLAINED, http://www.whatisrss.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2015) (“RSS

	
  

282

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 221

they can log in at will does not convert these forums into public
forums. If the school or any of its platforms is a non-public forum,
the school can censor speech within the specific forum in question
as long as the censorship is viewpoint neutral and reasonable.384
The school’s “decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need
only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only
reasonable limitation.”385
When a virtual school is opened up for specific topics or
specific groups, it becomes a limited public forum.386 As a limited
public forum, a virtual public school is “not required to and does
not allow persons to engage in every type of speech.” 387 The
school, however, does not wield unbridled censorship power as a
limited public forum: the First Amendment prohibits the school
from viewpoint discrimination and from imposing censorship that
is unreasonable when the purpose of the forum is considered.388
When a virtual public school is opened up for indiscriminate
public use, it becomes a designated public forum.389 As long as the
(Rich Site Summary) is a format for delivering regularly changing web content.
Many news-related sites, weblogs and other online publishers syndicate their
content as an RSS Feed to whoever wants it.”).
384
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (1985).
385
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
386
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
392–93 (1993); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,
46 n.7 (1983).
387
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001); see Perry
Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45–46.
388
See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; see also Good News Club, 533 U.S. at
106–07.
389
See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S.
at 45–46. In order for a court to find school property to be a designated public
forum or a limited public forum, the intent of the school to open up the property
must be clear as evidenced from policy or practice. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802–
03. See also Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998)
(“A designated public forum is not created when the government allows
selective access for individual speakers rather than general access for a class of
speakers.”).
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property is open to the public for indiscriminate use for speech or
assembly, a virtual school that is a designated public forum is
governed by the same First Amendment standards as a traditional
public forum.390 In other words, content-based censorship must be
justified by a compelling reason and the censorship must be
narrowly tailored to serve that reason.391 Further, as long as the
regulations leave open sufficient alternate speech forums, the
school may impose content-neutral speech regulations that are
narrowly tailored to satisfy a significant interest for the
censorship.392
A school that is a designated public forum or limited public
forum need not indefinitely remain a designated or limited public
forum; it can revert back to being a non-public forum if the school
closes the forum and returns it to its intended purposes.393 Further,
discrimination within limited public forums, or in designated
public forums against content or subject matter that fits the criteria
for which the forum was intentionally opened is subject to the
strict scrutiny standard of review.394 Thus, the school must have a
compelling interest and narrowly tailor its restriction on speech to
achieve the compelling interest.395
Even if a virtual school is a limited public forum or a
designated public forum, it does not mean that all forums within
the school are limited public forums or designated public forums
respectively.396 Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled that the First
Amendment does not obligate schools to provide equivalent access
to all parts of the school for communicative purposes. 397
390

See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45–46.
Id.
392
Id. at 45–46; see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1981).
393
See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46.
394
This is the essence of content-based discrimination.
395
See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n, 523 U.S. at 677; Perry Educ.
Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 49.
396
See generally Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37.
397
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 44; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 117–18 (1972) (“But we nowhere suggested that students,
teachers, or anyone else has an absolute constitutional right to use all parts of a
391
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Nevertheless, similar to a virtual school itself, computers and
Internet access at virtual schools could be designated public
forums, limited public forums or non-public forums, depending on
whether the school allows indiscriminate use of the schoolprovided computers and Internet access, or only permits use
limited to specific topics or groups.398
Students post comments on school discussion forums, blogs
and wikis that could be part of the school’s learning management
system.399 Those comments could disagree with or criticize other
students, the school, teachers, or administrators, or express views
that school officials find unacceptable. 400 Even though those
forums could be designated public forums (if the school opens
them up to indiscriminate use) or limited public forums (if the
school opens them up for use on specific topics or to its group of
students), they are generally non-public forums reserved for
school building or its immediate environs for his unlimited expressive
purposes.”).
398
We add the caveat that while the Supreme Court has not denied use of the
public forum doctrine in online contexts, it has expressed hesitancy about carte
blanche application of the doctrine to the Internet. See United States v. Am.
Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 207 n.3 (2003) (citing Denver Area Ed..
Telcoms. Consortium v. Fed FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996)) (“Even if
appellees had proffered more persuasive evidence that public libraries intended
to create a forum for speech by connecting to the Internet, we would hesitate to
import the public forum doctrine . . . wholesale into the context of the Internet
. . . . [W]e are wary of the notion that a partial analogy in one context, for which
we have developed doctrines, can compel a full range of decisions in such a new
and changing area.”). Nonetheless, the Court has ruled that the public forum
doctrine applies to all government property, including metaphysical spaces. See
Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 230 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (“[A] forum more in a
metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are
applicable.”); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804; Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 44. For
examples of the Court applying the public forum doctrine to discussion of
metaphysical forums, including the Internet, see generally Christian Legal Soc’y
Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2011); United States v.
Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
399
Jaffee, supra note 4, at 228.
400
Id.
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educational purposes. As non-public forums, the school can censor
speech on the discussion forums, blogs, and wikis if the censorship
is reasonable and not viewpoint discriminatory.401
Michigan Virtual School is a good example of a school that has
tried to establish a non-public forum theme in its AUP. The policy
provides in pertinent part:
MVS [Michigan Virtual School] instructional computing resources are
intended solely for course related activities specific to the intent of the
course the student is enrolled in.
A. Users shall not upload or post any software on MVS instructional
computing resources, including web development servers, which is not
specifically required and approved for course assignments. Nonapproved materials will be removed by the MVU [Michigan Virtual
University] staff without notice.
B. Users shall not post any MP3 files, compressed video or images
unless they are a part of the instructional activities in an MVS course,
nor load any other non-instructional media files to any MVS server.402

Virginia Virtual School’s policy, on the other hand, provides
that:
Communications via Virtual Virginia software and resources should
not be considered private. (This includes, but is not limited to, the email, pager, discussion board, blog, and chat tools in the course
management system and other Virtual Virginia resources.) Students . . .
who have the privilege to use virtual school online resources are
expected to . . . [u]se the online resources only for school-related,
educational activities.403
401

Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46.
Michigan Virtual School, supra note 40 (“MVS or MVU are used
interchangeably in this agreement.”).
403
Virginia Virtual School, Student and Parent Handbook: Virtual Virginia,
VA. DEPT. OF EDUC. 16 (2014), http://www.virtualvirginia.org/students/
handbook/downloads/student_handbook.pdf (last visited June 21, 2015).
Philadelphia School District’s AUP clearly shows its system is intended to be a
non-public forum: “The district has the right to place restrictions on the use of
equipment, resources and material users access or disclose through the district’s
Internet, computers and network resources. Users are expected to follow School
Reform Commission policies and administrative procedures governing conduct
and discipline, and law and regulations, in their use of the district’s Internet,
computers and network resources. . . . This access has not been established as a
public access service or a public forum. . . .” The School District of
402

	
  

286

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 221

As with both Michigan and Virginia Virtual Schools, any
virtual school looking to control student speech should characterize
its learning platforms as non-public forums. 404 For evidentiary
purposes, on each platform, the school could explicitly disavow
any intent to create a limited public forum or designated public
forum. The school must also ensure its practices do not provide
any basis for a court to find circumstantial or direct evidence that
the platform was opened up intentionally to create a limited public
forum or designated public forum.
IX.
GOVERNMENT SPEECH ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the right of
government entities to speak on various issues, free from
competing voices and the restraints of the Free Speech Clause,

Philadelphia, supra note 40. See also id. (“Users shall have no expectation of
privacy in anything they create, store, send, delete, receive or display on or over
the district’s Internet, computers or network resources, including personal files
or any use of the district’s Internet, computers or network resources. The district
reserves the right to monitor, track, and log network access and use . . . .”).
404
Louisiana Virtual School’s AUP, for instance, clearly states that “Students
will work within the confines of the infrastructure of Blackboard.com for
messaging, bulletin/discussion board use, and virtual chat (unless directed
elsewhere by the instructor).” Louisiana Virtual School, supra note 40, at 2. The
policy further provides that “Posting personal messages outside of classroom
content shall be forbidden.” Id. See also Florida Virtual School, supra note 41,
at 32 (restricting emails to course-related content). Virginia Virtual School seeks
to maintain the reins on its forums by including the following in its policy: “As
cited in Virtual Virginia’s Acceptable Use Policy, students should not consider
communication within Virtual Virginia’s course management system as private.
Communication through the pager, e-mail, discussion board, chat, blog, and
other communication tools provided by Virtual Virginia is subject to monitoring
by Virtual Virginia staff without other prior notice. Inappropriate use of any
Virtual Virginia communication tool, such as using these tools for profanity or
cyberbullying, is grounds for discipline including but not necessarily limited to
the following: parental contact; local school contact; application of local student
code of conduct consequences; administrative removal from Virtual Virginia
courses; or contact of law enforcement agencies in instances where violation of
local, state, or federal laws is suspected.” Virginia Virtual School, supra note
403.
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pursuant to the government-speech doctrine. 405 This “recently
minted” doctrine 406 has particular application to virtual schools
because it empowers schools to censor speech without First
Amendment consequence. 407 Government speech can best be
described as follows:
Government speech is a broad category that includes any government
action that communicates or subsidizes the communication of a
particular message. It encompasses activities from appropriating
taxpayer money to campaign for or against specific legislative
measures to deciding who gets access to public fora such as theatres
and broadcasting frequencies to offering a program of subsidies for
expression—for example, funding for the arts—that makes contentbased decisions among qualified applicants. The government can be
said to ‘speak’ when it pays for speech directly, when it provides access
to public property for the communication of a given message, or when
an elected official voices her opinion on a given issue.408

The Supreme Court articulated the government-speech doctrine
in Rust v. Sullivan. 409 In Rust, petitioners claimed that federal
regulations prohibiting Title X fund recipients from conducting
abortion-related activities violated the First Amendment because
the regulations barred those recipients from discussing abortion as
an option for family planning while requiring them to offer
information about carrying a pregnancy to term.410 The Supreme
Court rejected the petitioners’ argument, reasoning that the

405

Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
407
The Supreme Court has recognized applicability of the government-speech
doctrine in not only physical spaces but also metaphysical spaces. Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). Accordingly, the
doctrine is applicable to online platforms.
408
Charlotte H. Taylor, Hate Speech and Government Speech, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1115, 1142–43 (2010).
409
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). See also Velazquez, 531 U.S. at
541 (“The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the
counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental
speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have
explained Rust on this understanding.”).
410
See Rust, 500 U.S. at 177–78, 192.
406
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government has the right to espouse and even promote certain
values.411 The Court explained that:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the
public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program
which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, the
Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other. A
legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental
right does not infringe the right.412

Thus, if the government chooses to support democratic values,
it is not required to support competing ideologies like communism
and fascism.413 In the same vein, if virtual schools, on their learning
management systems, webinars, video or audio conferences, or
other platforms choose to espouse values more suitable to
education, they can opt to disallow competing values on those
platforms. Indeed, in Rosenberger v. Rector, the Supreme Court
empowered government entities to make content-based decisions
when government speech is involved.414 Specifically, in addressing
whether the University of Virginia had made unconstitutional
content-based choices, the Court stated:

411

See id. at 192–93 (“[T]he government may make a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that judgment by the
allocation of public funds.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
412
Id. at 193 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
413
Id. at 194; see also ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 379 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“Government can certainly speak out on public issues supported by a broad
consensus, even though individuals have a First Amendment right not to express
agreement. For instance, government can distribute pins that say ‘Register and
Vote,’ issue postage stamps during World War II that say ‘Win the War,’ and
sell license plates that say ‘Spay or Neuter your Pets.’ Citizens clearly have the
First Amendment right to oppose such widely-accepted views, but that right
cannot conceivably require the government to distribute ‘Don’t Vote’ pins, to
issue postage stamps in 1942 that say ‘Stop the War,’ or to sell license plates
that say ‘Spaying or Neutering your Pet is Cruel.’” (footnotes omitted)).
414
See generally Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819 (1995) (discussing government entities’ authority to engage in contentbased censorship if the speech is government speech).
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[W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices.
When the University determines the content of the education it
provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the
government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when
it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own
message.415

This same rule would apply to virtual schools, authorizing
them to make content-based decisions on their platforms pursuant
to the government-speech doctrine.
The United States Supreme Court further defined/elucidated
nuances of government-speech in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Ass’n.416 The Court ruled speech must be “effectively controlled”
by the government entity for it to be deemed government speech.417
Virtual schools would be wise to be intentional in documenting
their efforts showing that they satisfy the following five factors
that prove that speech is “effectively controlled” by them:418 (1) the
school created the speech “from beginning to end”; (2) the school
“set out the overarching message” of the speech; (3) any nongovernment entity (including students) authorized by the school to
contribute some details to the speech remained accountable to the
school for the speech; (4) the school had “final approval authority
over every word used”; and (5) the school reviewed the speech’s
wording and substance.419 If the school “sets the overall message to
415

Id. at 833.
544 U.S. 550 (2005).
417
Id. at 560.
418
See id. at 560–61 (discussing these five factors identified by the Supreme
Court as essential to proving that a government entity is in control of speech).
These are referred to as the Johanns factors.
419
Id. A sixth pertinent factor considers whether the government entity
attended and participated in open meetings for the development of the proposal
or program that contained the speech. Prior to Johanns, several federal courts of
appeals applied a non-exclusive four-factor list to determine if speech was
private or government speech: the central purpose of the program in which the
speech occurs, the degree of editorial control exercised by government or private
entities over speech content, the identity of the literal speaker, and whether the
government or private entity bears the ultimate responsibility for the content of
the speech. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of Va.
Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618–19 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing the
416
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be communicated and approves every word that is disseminated, it
is not precluded from relying on the government speech doctrine
merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental
sources [including students] in developing specific messages.”420
More recently, in Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum,421 the
Court ruled that private speech, not government speech, is subject
to the Free Speech Clause. 422 Therefore, when speech is
government speech, the government entity has wide latitude to
decide what it says and to “say what it wishes.”423 In this light, a
virtual school has the power to “select the views that it wants to
express” from competing views.424 The Court explained that, in
order to function effectively, the “government has to say
something, and a First Amendment heckler’s veto of any forced
contribution to raising the government’s voice in the ‘marketplace
of ideas’ would be out of the question.”425
In consonance with the Supreme Court, “in freedom of speech
cases, lower courts have accepted the Rust-inspired government
speech doctrine and seem to be aware that when the government
has a message to send, such a message need not be viewpointneutral, and other messages need not receive governmental
support.”426 This was evident in Downs v. Los Angeles Unified

four factors); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 203
F.3d 1085, 1093–94 (8th Cir. 2000). It is unclear if these factors will and should
continue to play as key a role as they did prior to Johanns.
420
Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562.
421
555 U.S. 460 (2009).
422
See id. at 467.
423
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
833).
424
Summum, 555 U.S. at 467 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 194; Nat’l Endowment
for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)). See also
Summum, 555 U.S. at 468 (“[I]t is the very business of government to favor and
disfavor points of view.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
425
Summum, 555 U.S. at 468 (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574 (Souter, J.,
dissenting)).
426
Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365,
379 (2009).
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School Dist.427 In Downs, a public school teacher posted counterspeech in response to his/her district’s speech on school bulletin
boards, celebrating Gay and Lesbian Awareness month. 428 The
court of appeals ruled that the bulletin boards represented “an
example of the government opening up its own mouth”; therefore,
constituting government speech.429 Hence, the district did not have
to share its podium with counter-speech.430 Furthermore, the court
ruled “[s]imply because the government opens its mouth to speak
does not give every outside individual or group a First Amendment
right to play ventriloquist.” 431 The court highlighted a key
distinction between public forum (which involves government
regulation of private speech) and government speech (which is
government regulation of government speech):
[W]hen a public high school is the speaker, its control of its own
speech is not subject to the constraints of constitutional safeguards and
forum analysis, but instead is measured by practical considerations
applicable to any individual’s choice of how to convey oneself: among
other things, content, timing, and purpose.432

Discussion forums, blogs, wikis, and other message forums for
virtual schools are similar to the bulletin board in the Downs case.
Although the school solicits the views of students in promoting its
broader educational message, in those forums, the school should be
able to edit or entirely censor student speech that is counter to the
school’s message. In order for speech in forums made available to
students to constitute government speech, however, the school
must show that the speech satisfies the five factors above from the
Johanns case.433
As the Supreme Court has emphasized, when the government
platform conveys a message over which the government has
editorial control and final authority, even if private citizens
427

Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1005–08.
429
Id. at 1012–13.
430
Id.
431
Id. at 1013.
432
Id. at 1011–13.
433
Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562.
428
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participate in the speech, the message is still government speech.434
Moreover, in the case of government speech, virtual schools have
the right to exclude “unwelcomed speech in the time, place, and
space of government speech activity.” 435 Given the significant
control that the government-speech doctrine affords over student
speech, shrewd virtual schools would set up their various platforms
in such a way that speech within those platforms qualify as
government speech. Virtual schools should include clear language
on their platforms stating that all communication thereon
constitutes government speech. For evidentiary purposes, the
school could explicitly document that, in practice and intent, it
meets the requirements of the five Johanns factors; and that it has
clearly and indubitably communicated to students that the school
retains absolute editorial control over all content on the school’s
platforms. For schools seeking more authority over student
communication, it would be foolish not to document compliance
with the Johanns factors in a calculated effort to capitalize on the
government-speech doctrine. After all, the government-speech
doctrine makes possible “what had previously been thought
forbidden: the burdening, even if not silencing, of private
viewpoints because the government disagrees with them.”436
X.
CONTENT-BASED DISCRIMINATION AND ACCEPTABLE
USE POLICIES: NETIQUETTE RESTRICTIONS AND OFFENSIVE
STATEMENTS
Acceptable Use Policies (“AUPs”) regulate student access to
digital content in order to protect students from online vices and to

434

Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 203 F.3d at 1094. For more on the
government-speech doctrine, see Joseph O. Oluwole, Revisiting Parents
Involved v. Seattle School District: Race Consciousness and the GovernmentSpeech Doctrine, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 393 (2013); Joseph Blocher,
Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695 (2011);
Randall P. Bezanson, The Manner of Government Speech, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
809 (2010); Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975 (2011).
435
Bezanson, supra note 434, at 809.
436
Blocher, supra note 434, at 695.
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preserve the learning environment.437 The following explication of
the design behind AUPs (netiquette codes) 438 fastidiously reveals
troubling concerns about student access to technology, especially
in an educational environment:
A critical concern is: How can we best assure that students will not
have access to pornography, hate sites, or other pernicious Internet
content or experience sexual or physical harassment. There is also
concern about students wasting instructional time in social media sites,
engaging in cyberbullying, harassing of other students, or cheating on
tests.439

In addition, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)
has identified five elements that must be addressed in AUPs:
(a) Access by minors to inappropriate matter on the Internet;
(b) The safety and security of minors when using electronic mail, chat
rooms and other forms of direct electronic communications;
(c) Unauthorized access, including so-called “hacking,” and other
unlawful activities by minors online;
(d) Unauthorized disclosure, use, and dissemination of personal
information regarding minors; and
(e) Measures restricting minors’ access to materials harmful to them.440

The above concerns, as well as the FCC mandates, have fueled
schools’ design and use of AUPs to engage in content-based
discrimination in an effort to ensure student safety and academic
success.441
AUPs span a broad range in their approach to censoring student
speech:
In public schools, this approach often presents itself in policies that
prohibit broad categories of behavior or access: banning cell phones,
blocking social networking sites, filtering certain topics or words.
Taken to an extreme, these policies can lead to results ranging from
437

See section IV titled “Enforcement of Student Behavior.”
Netiquette refers to network etiquette. It is also a reference to the rules of
appropriate speech dictated in AUPs. Michigan Virtual School, supra note 40.
439
Bosco, supra note 39.
440
Id. at 3 (citing Children’s Internet Protection Act, § 1701, 114 Stat. 2763A335, available at https://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/cipa.pdf (last
visited June 16, 2015).
441
Bosco, supra note 39 at 3.
438
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humorous (one student was unable to do a report on his Congressman,
Dick Armey, due to a keyword filter) to truly restrictive (a new policy
in one Massachusetts district limits teachers and students to using only
online services that have been approved by, and signed contracts with,
the district).442

AUPs that single out a specific kind of speech (e.g. race,
gender, or sexual orientation discrimination) for protection might
run into content-based discrimination challenges. 443 AUPs also
sometimes prohibit racial slurs and racially-discriminatory
comments. 444 Michigan Virtual School’s AUP, for instance,
prohibits “bigotry, racism, [and] hatred.” 445 Virginia Virtual
School’s AUP, on the other hand, states in pertinent part: “Do not
use expressions of bigotry, racism, and/or hate.”446 Agora Cyber
Charter School’s AUP provides that students should not “use
derogatory comments, including those regarding race, age, gender,
sexual orientation, religion, ability, political persuasion, body type,
physical or mental health, or access issues.”447 Such provisions are
designed to censor hate speech – speech targeting the victim
442

Shelley B. Chamberlain et al., MASS. EDUC. TECH. ADVISORY COUNCIL,
RESPONSIBLE TECHNOLOGY USE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1–2 (2009), available at
http://www.doe.mass.edu/boe/sac/edtech/safety.pdf (last visited June 21, 2015).
443
See Geng, supra note 1, at 162 (“[I]f a regulation distinguishes on its face
between ‘favored speech [and] disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or
views’ being expressed, then it is content-based.” (citing Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994)).
444
Austin Independent School District, AUSTIN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT ACCEPTABLE USE GUIDELINES 1 (2013), https://www.austinisd.org/
sites/default/files/dept/technology/docs/AU_Guidelines_20131206.pdf
(last
visited June 21, 2015) (prohibiting “inappropriate language such as swear
words, vulgarity, ethnic or racial slurs, and any other inflammatory language.”)
445
Michigan Virtual School, supra note 40.
446
Virginia Department of Education, supra note 42 at 16; see The School
District of Philadelphia, supra note 40, at 7 (“Users shall not use the district’s
Internet, computers or network resources to access, send, receive, transfer, view,
share, or download material that is profane, obscene, pornographic, advocates
illegal acts, or that advocates violence or discrimination towards other people
(hate literature).”); see also id. at 8 (“Users shall not use obscene, profane, lewd,
vulgar, rude, inflammatory, hateful, threatening or disrespectful language. 13.
Users shall not engage in personal attacks, including prejudicial or
discriminatory attacks.”).
447
Agora Cyber Charter School, supra note 50 at 43.
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simply because he actually belongs to, or is perceived to belong to,
a particular class.448 “Thus, epithets such as ‘nigger,’ ‘wetback,’
‘honkey,’ ‘kike,’ ‘gook,’ ‘spic,’ ‘faggot,’ ‘wop,’ or ‘mick,’
constitute hate speech when addressed to persons perceived to be
members of the disfavored class.”449
According to the Consortium for School Networking, many
school districts are dropping their traditional AUP approaches,
replacing them with “responsible use policies” (RUPs).450 RUPs
are different from traditional AUPs in that they view and deal with
“the student as a person responsible for ethical and healthy use of
the Internet and mobile devices.” 451 Additionally, AUPs are
“policies geared towards avoidance rather than education” whereas
RUPs are geared toward education rather than avoidance. 452 In
essence, while AUPs focus on what students should not do, RUPs
present what students should do—an educational approach. 453
RUPs rely on students to make responsible choices among
competing content and to learn from consequences of their choices

448

Michael S. Degan, “Adding the First Amendment to the Fire”: Cross
Burning and Hate Crime Laws, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1109, 1112 (1993).
449
Id. at 1112–13. See id. at 1113 (“Whereas hate crimes involve the biasrelated selection of a victim in the commission of an otherwise criminal act, hate
speech refers only to the biased content of certain speech. Theoretically, hate
crimes do not necessarily contain an element of speech because an individual
could remain silent during the commission of a hate crime, but the surrounding
circumstances nevertheless may reveal a biased motive . . . However, a
determination that an assailant has committed a hate crime generally requires the
presence of spoken words reflecting the assailant’s biased motive.”).
450
See generally CONSORTIUM FOR SCHOOL NETWORKING, MAKING PROGRESS:
RETHINKING STATE AND SCHOOL DISTRICT POLICIES CONCERNING MOBILE
TECHNOLOGIES AND SOCIAL MEDIA 2 (2012), http://www.splc.org/pdf/
making_progress_2012.pdf (last visited June 16, 2015) (discussing the move
toward responsible use policies). See also Chamberlain et al., supra note 442, at 1.
451
CONSORTIUM FOR SCHOOL NETWORKING, supra note 450, at 6.
452
Chamberlain et al., supra note 442, at 1.
453
CONSORTIUM FOR SCHOOL NETWORKING, supra note 450, at 6 (2012); see
also Chamberlain et al., supra note 442, at 3 (“Many acceptable use policies for
students read like a list of unacceptable uses . . .”).
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through such measures as school discipline and teachable
moments.454
Even then, whenever a school disciplines a student for speech
choices, pursuant to an AUP or an RUP, based on the content of
the speech, a question arises as to whether the school is acting
within constitutional bounds; particularly because the First
Amendment does not favor content-based censorship.455 In fact, the
analysis of such AUPs or RUPs must begin with the fact that
content-based restrictions on speech are “presumptively invalid.”456
The censoring government entity can overcome the presumption
by showing that the content of the speech has “such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.”457 Speech that the Supreme Court has found to satisfy
this standard, and therefore qualified per se for content-based
restrictions, are fighting words,458 obscenity,459 defamation,460 child
pornography, 461 and true threats. 462 A school can censor these
categories of speech “because of their constitutionally proscribable
454

Bosco, supra note 39 at 2.
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1994) (“[W]hile a
content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances to show that a
regulation is content based, it is not necessary to such a showing in all cases.
Nor will the mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose be enough to save a law
which, on its face, discriminates based on content.” (internal citations omitted)).
456
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Daniel Aisaka
& Rachel Clune, Hate Crime Regulation And Challenges, 14 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 469, 479 (2013).
457
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
458
Id. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2355 (1989) (“[R]acist speech is so
common that it is seen as part of the ordinary jostling and conflict people are
expected to tolerate, rather than as fighting words.”).
459
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); See also Joseph O. Oluwole,
Preston C. Green, & Melissa Stackpole, SextEd: Obscenity Versus Free Speech
In Our Schools, 25-49 (2013); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
460
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
461
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Oluwole et al., supra note 459,
at 51–66 (2013).
462
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
455
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content” but it cannot censor their non-proscribable content
because it favors or disfavors the content.463
The United States Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of content-based hate speech restrictions in R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota.464 In that case, the city of St. Paul,
Minnesota alleged that petitioner and other teenagers burned a
cross in an African American family’s yard.465 The city charged the
petitioner with a hate crime under an ordinance that regulated
speech on the basis of its content:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly
conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.466

This provision is very similar to those of the AUPs above that
single out speech for regulation on such basis as race. The
petitioner challenged the ordinance as unconstitutional contentbased discrimination under the First Amendment.467 The Supreme
Court agreed, holding that the ordinance unconstitutionally barred
“otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the
speech addresses.” 468 The Court ruled that government entities
cannot regulate speech based on hostility or favor toward the
speech.469
The Court found unacceptable that, under the ordinance,
“[d]isplays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or
severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the
specified disfavored topics.”470 Therefore, “[t]hose who wish to use
‘fighting words’ in connection with other ideas—to express
hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union
463

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 383–84, 386–87 (1992).
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
465
Id. at 379.
466
Id. at 380.
467
Id.
468
Id.
469
Id. at 386.
470
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.
464
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membership, or homosexuality—are not covered.” 471 Unlike the
other virtual schools’ provisions referenced above, Agora Cyber
Charter School’s provision bars all uses of derogatory
comments.472 Further, it merely uses classes such as race, gender,
sexual orientation, inter alia, as examples, as evident in its use of
the word “including.”473 As a result, Agora’s provision is unlike the
St. Paul ordinance. Thus, the Court might not find Agora’s
provision as objectionable as St. Paul’s ordinance, which only
barred “abusive invective”, based on the specified classes.474
As part of its content-based analysis, the Court also found St.
Paul’s ordinance unconstitutional because it promoted viewpoint
discrimination.475 Specifically, the Court objected to the ordinance
only prohibiting fighting words that, for instance, invoked race (or
any of the other classes) in a negative sense while allowing use in a
positive sense:
In its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even beyond
mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination.
Displays containing some words—odious racial epithets, for
example—would be prohibited to proponents of all views. But ‘fighting
words’ that do not themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or
gender—aspersions upon a person’s mother, for example—would
seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor
of racial, color, etc., tolerance and equality, but could not be used by
those speakers’ opponents. One could hold up a sign saying, for
example, that all ‘anti-Catholic bigots’ are misbegotten; but not that all
‘papists’ are, for that would insult and provoke violence ‘on the basis of
religion.’ St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate
to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensberry rules.476

The Court explained that while the city should confront
fighting words that include “messages of ‘bias-motivated’ hatred
471

Id.
Agora Cyber Charter School, supra note 50 at 42.
473
Id.
474
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.
475
Id. See Geng, supra note 1, at 163–64 (2014) (“[E]ven in situations where
the government makes content-based regulations, those regulations must still be
viewpoint-neutral.”).
476
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391–92.
472
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and in particular, as applied to this case, messages ‘based on
virulent notions of racial supremacy’ . . . the manner of that
confrontation cannot consist of selective limitations upon
speech.”477
Despite the Supreme Court’s evident admission that burning of
crosses in others’ yards is “reprehensible,”478 the Court made a
notable observation; notable because it revealed the Court’s
distaste for content-based regulation of hate speech even when the
speech is despised:
St. Paul’s brief asserts that a general ‘fighting words’ law would not
meet the city’s needs because only a content-specific measure can
communicate to minority groups that the ‘group hatred’ aspect of such
speech ‘is not condoned by the majority.’ The point of the First
Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in some
fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content.479

This is disfavorable because the Court is in essence
encouraging broader censorship of speech than is necessary to
achieve effective regulation of hate speech.480
477

Id. at 392.
Id. See Matsuda, supra note 458, at 2353 (noting the values that have led to
protection of even racist expressions are “part of the American structure of
government and the American commitment to political and civil rights. The
American position may be extreme, but it responds to American circumstances.
It recalls the times when our commitment to freedom was tested — the Sedition
Act, the McCarthy era, the movement for racial justice, the riots and protests of
the Vietnam age. Our commitment to the position has been neither steadfast nor
universal. Judges have sometimes failed to understand it, resulting in loose
doctrinal ends. The basic principle, however, has survived, and the thrust of the
cases and commentary supports first amendment primacy.”).
479
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396.
480
Id. at 393–94 ( The Court added that the city’s content-based regulation of
hate speech did not fit any of the exceptions to unconstitutional content-based
regulation; and its selective focus on race, gender and religion was problematic:
The content-based discrimination reflected in the St. Paul ordinance comes
within neither any of the specific exceptions [obscenity and defamation] to the
First Amendment prohibition we discussed earlier nor a more general exception
for content discrimination that does not threaten censorship of ideas. It assuredly
does not fall within the exception for content discrimination based on the very
reasons why the particular class of speech at issue (here, fighting words) is
proscribable. As explained earlier, the reason why fighting words are
478
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The Court ruled that a content-based regulation is only
permissible if the government entity has a compelling end for the
regulation; and the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling end.481 The city of St. Paul argued that its regulation
was driven by a compelling interest in affording human rights and
protection to groups that have historically faced discrimination;
and enabling them to live without harassment. 482 The Supreme
Court did not dismiss these interests as non-compelling.483 Instead,
the Court stated that “[w]e do not doubt that these interests are
compelling, and that the ordinance can be said to promote them.”484
Similarly, schools have reason to censor hate speech since such
speech carries real health consequences for students:
“physiological symptoms and emotional distress ranging from fear
in the gut, rapid pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, nightmares,
post-traumatic stress disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and
suicide.” 485 It causes such inner pain for the victims that hate

categorically excluded from the protection of the First Amendment is not that
their content communicates any particular idea, but that their content embodies a
particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever
idea the speaker wishes to convey. St. Paul has not singled out an especially
offensive mode of expression—it has not, for example, selected for prohibition
only those fighting words that communicate ideas in a threatening (as opposed
to a merely obnoxious) manner. Rather, it has proscribed fighting words of
whatever manner that communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious
intolerance. Selectivity of this sort creates the possibility that the city is seeking
to handicap the expression of particular ideas. That possibility would alone be
enough to render the ordinance presumptively invalid, but St. Paul’s comments
and concessions in this case elevate the possibility to a certainty) (internal
citation omitted).
481
Id. at 395.
482
Id.
483
Id.
484
Id.
485
Matsuda, supra note 458, at 2336. See id. at 2340 (“Psychologists and
sociologists have done much to document the effects of racist messages on both
victims and dominant-group members. Writers of color have given us graphic
portrayals of what life is like for victims of racist propaganda . . . From the
victim’s perspective racist hate messages cause real damage.”).
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speech has been characterized as a murder of the spirit.486 Victims
end up isolating themselves from others, self-censoring, and even
stopping their education. 487 In fact, research reveals that the
psychological damage from hate speech can be crushing and
unavoidable:488
Research in psychosocial and psycholinguistic analysis of racism
suggests a related effect of racist hate propaganda: at some level, no
matter how much both victims and well-meaning dominant-group
members resist it, racial inferiority is planted in our minds as an idea
that may hold some truth. The idea is improbable and abhorrent, but it
is there before us, because it is presented repeatedly. ‘Those people’ are
lazy, dirty, sexualized, money-grubbing, dishonest, inscrutable, we are
told. We reject the idea, but the next time we sit next to one of ‘those
people’ the dirt message, the sex message, is triggered. We stifle it,
reject it as wrong, but it is there, interfering with our perception and
interaction with the person next to us. For the victim, similarly, the
angry rejection of the message of inferiority is coupled with absorption
of the message. When a dominant-group member responds favorably,
there is a moment of relief – the victims of hate messages do not
always believe in their insides that they deserve decent treatment. This
obsequious moment is degrading and dispiriting when the self-aware
victim acknowledges it.489

A problem could arise for students if the Supreme Court deems
these health damages as mere emotional consequences of speech.
After all, the Court has ruled that “[t]he emotive impact of speech
on its audience” is not a constitutionally-recognized exception to
the rule against content-based regulation.490
486

Id. at 2336–37 (citing Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger:
The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 MIAMI L.
REV. 127, 139 (1987)).
487
Matsuda, supra note 458 at 2336–37.
488
Id. at 2237–41.
489
Id. at 2239–40. See also id. at 2237–38. (“One subconscious response is to
reject one’s own identity as a victim-group member. As writers portraying the
African-American experience have noted, the price of disassociating from one’s
own race is often sanity itself. As much as one may try to resist a piece of hate
propaganda, the effect on one’s self-esteem and sense of personal security is
devastating. To be hated, despised, and alone is the ultimate fear of all human
beings. However irrational racist speech may be, it hits right at the emotional
place where we feel the most pain.”).
490
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 394.
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Even if the Court finds these interests compelling, the
challenge lies in whether the content-based regulation is narrowly
tailored to serve the compelling interests.491 Schools would have to
ensure that there are no content-neutral alternatives that can readily
address the compelling interests.492 According to the Court, “the
danger of censorship presented by a facially content-based statute,
requires that weapon be employed only where it is necessary to
serve the asserted [compelling] interest. The existence of adequate
content-neutral alternatives thus undercut[s] significantly any
defense of such a statute.”493
The Court’s disfavor of content-based discrimination might
make it inclined to find AUPs that single out specific content for
regulation unconstitutional.494 After all, the Court signaled just that
in R.A.V., when it found that, even if the city had compelling
interests, its content-based regulation was not narrowly tailored.495
The Court artfully reasoned that there was at least one contentneutral alternative available:
An ordinance not limited to the favored topics, for example, would
have precisely the same beneficial effect. In fact the only interest
distinctively served by the content limitation is that of displaying the
city council’s special hostility towards the particular biases thus singled
out. That is precisely what the First Amendment forbids. The
politicians of St. Paul are entitled to express that hostility—but not
through the means of imposing unique limitations upon speakers who
(however benightedly) disagree.496

491

Id. at 395.
Id.
493
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
494
This would especially be so when the student is regarded as off-campus,
and thus in citizen status, under the Constitution, similar to all citizens including
adults. For citizens, “[w]hat the American position means in the area of race is
that expressions of the ideas of racial inferiority or racial hatred are protected.
Anyone who wants to say that African Americans and Jews are inferior and
deserving of persecution is entitled to. However loathsome this idea may be, it is
still political speech. The law becomes strong at its edges.” Matsuda, supra note
458 at 2351 (1989).
495
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395.
496
Id.
492
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Similarly, the Court might artfully and painstakingly search out
content-neutral alternatives to content-based provisions in AUPs.
The Court distinguished St. Paul’s ordinance from Title VII,
which prohibits employment discrimination on grounds such as
race and gender, inter alia.497 Distinctively, the Court noted that
Title VII did not violate the First Amendment’s content-neutral
requirement because Title VII’s prohibition of racial and gender is
merely a “content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of
speech . . . swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute
directed at conduct rather than speech.”498 In other words, Title VII
was designed to target conduct, not speech; the regulation of
speech is merely incidental to regulation of conduct. Thus, AUPs
that similarly regulate conduct, with mere incidental regulation of
speech, would survive a content-based discrimination challenge.
The synopsis is that, in assessing AUP content-based
censorship of hate speech, the Court would look to whether the
school can achieve the same end—prohibition of hate speech—
with a broader prohibition that does not single out specific content
such as race, gender, or sexual orientation. Before adopting
content-based regulation of hate speech, schools must, therefore,
make a conscientious effort to justify that the regulation is
narrowly tailored. They can accomplish this by documenting that
there were no content-neutral alternatives; or that content-neutral
alternatives would not achieve “precisely the same” compelling
end.499
XI.
CONCLUSION
The emergence of virtual schools, blended with opportunities
for potentially far-reaching virtual student speech, has raised new
challenges for school officials seeking to censor student speech;
particularly because of the Internet’s pervasiveness and borderless
nature. It has also fueled further uncertainty regarding the
distinction between on-campus speech and off-campus speech.
497

Id. at 389.
Id. (applying the reasoning to the other protected classes under Title VII.).
499
Id. at 396.
498
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While the debate over the distinction between on-campus and offcampus speech preceded the advent of the Internet, the fusion of
schooling and the Internet has distended the ambivalence in the
off-campus versus on-campus jurisprudence. Schools officials and
students are unsure of the scope of their censorship authority and
their First Amendment rights, respectively.
This Article provided some clarity for school officials. The
analysis revealed that school officials can censor virtual student
speech based on the forum—traditional public forum, designated
public forum, limited public forum, nonpublic forum—of the
speech. They can also censor all virtual speech that qualifies as
government speech. However, when schools use AUPs and RUPs
to censor student speech, the provisions of those policies could be
challenged as unconstitutional content-based discrimination;
especially when those policies seek to regulate hate speech.
Schools that rely on AUPs and RUPs to censor hate speech must
ensure that they can clearly articulate compelling reason(s) for
those censorship provisions; and that the censorship in the
provisions is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling reason(s).
What emerges from the analysis in this Article is that “[e]ven with
the vastly increased opportunity to speak and be heard created by
the Internet, the exceptions to First Amendment protection for
student speech remain narrowly drawn even for immature and
foolishly defiant students.”500 Accordingly, the First Amendment
remains a safe haven for students.
The analysis in this Article also revealed that virtual schools
can censor on-campus speech pursuant to the four Supreme Court
tests for student speech: the material and substantial disruption test,
the Bethel test, the Hazelwood test and the Morse test. When
speech is off-campus courts require that school officials establish a
nexus between the speech and the school. School officials should
not, however, be allowed to “police students’ out-of-school speech

500

Beidler v. North Thurston School District No. 99-2-00236-6, 3 (Wash.
Super. Ct.) (July 18, 2000).
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by patrolling the public discourse.”501 Even if school officials are
empowered to censor on-campus speech in order to maintain the
educational environment, students need an outlet, or safe space, to
express pent up emotions through speech. As evident in the cases
discussed earlier, student speech that schools seek to censor is
imbued with emotions. With the controlled nature of the campus
environment, the outlet and safe space for venting students is
typically off-campus.
Students must be allowed to express themselves cognitively
and emotionally, particularly when they are not engaged in schoolrelated work. Such expression might be a way to avert another
tragedy as happened at Columbine High School. 502 If students
know they have an outlet for their emotions, they might be less
inclined to engage in depravity (as happened at Columbine High
School); or even to act irresponsibly upon pent-up emotions.503
This need to protect emotionally-charged speech is important even
if the speech is critical of school officials. As the United States
Supreme Court stated in Cohen v. California:
We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of
the cognitive content of individual speech has little or no regard for that
emotive function which practically speaking, may often be the more
important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.
Indeed, . . . [o]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the
right to criticize public men and measures—and that means not only
informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly
and without moderation.504

Indeed, “[i]f societies are not to explode from festering
tensions, there must be valves through which citizens may blow off
steam. Openness fosters resiliency; peaceful protest displaces more
501

Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 217 n.16
(3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
502
See David L. Hudson, Jr., Censorship Of Student Internet Speech: The
Effect Of Diminishing Student Rights, Fear Of The Internet And Columbine,
2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 199 (2000) (discussing the Columbine
High School tragedy).
503
The outlet of expression might also enable schools to quickly identify
students who need help so that appropriate intervention can be provided.
504
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
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violence than it triggers; free debate dissipates more hate than it
stirs.”505

505

Clay Calvert, Off-campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of
the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 282 (2001)
(citing Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech In An Open Society, 13 (1992)).

